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ABSTRACT 
BLOOM, Lois; LIGHTBOWN, PATSY; and HooD, Lois. Structure and Variation 
in Child Language. With Commentary by MELISSA BOWERMAN, and 
MICHAEL MARATSOS; with Reply by the authors. Monographs of the So- 
ciety for Research in Child Development, 1975, 40(2, Serial No. 160). 
Patterns of structure and variation are described in the language de- 
velopment of four children in the period in which mean length of utterance 
progressed from 1.0 to approximately 2.5 morphemes. Verb relations were 
of central importance in the children's language learning, and there was a 
similar developmental sequence among the children in the emergence of 
several semantic-syntactic categories of verb relations. Possible linguistic and 
cognitive explanations for the obtained developmental sequence are dis- 
cussed. There was variation among the children in the lexical representation 
in utterances: although all four children presented the same semantics in 
their utterances-they talked about the same kinds of things and in the same 
sequence in the course of development-they did not use the same linguistic 
means for representing the same information. Two of the children learned 
a system of pronominal reference to persons and objects in verb relations, 
whereas the other two children learned categories of nominal forms relative 
to verbs. The developments within each system were orderly and predictable 
across time as each child proceeded to learn the other system and thereby 
acquired the capacity for alternative pronominal and nominal reference. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Research in child language to date has resulted in a consensus about 
the semantics of early two- and three-word sentences. Studies of children 
learning English and certain other languages (Bloom 1970, 1973; Bowerman 
1973a; Brown 1973; Schlesinger 1971; Slobin 1971) have revealed that the 
semantics of early sentences have to do with ideas about objects that origi- 
nate in the development of sensorimotor intelligence in the child's first 2 
years. During this period children learn that objects exist, cease to exist, and 
recur; that objects can be acted upon and located in space; that people do 
things to objects or are otherwise associated with objects. It should not be 
surprising that these are the kinds of things that children first learn to talk 
about. However, the linguistic means that children learn for the represen- 
tation of such notions, the sequence of development in child grammar, and 
the relation of systems of child language to the adult model remain to be de- 
termined. 
DESCRIPTIONS OF CHILD LANGUAGE 
Certain claims that have been made thus far for what children learn in 
order to say sentences have been based upon observed evidence-for exam- 
ple, that children learn relative word position (Braine 1963) and that chil- 
dren learn semantic distinctions for reference to objects and events (Bloom 
1970; Bowerman 1973a; Brown 1973; Schlesinger 1971). Other claims for 
the origin of the child's early linguistic system have been derived from such 
linguistic theories as generative transformational grammar (e.g., Chomsky 
1965; McNeill 1966, 1970) and case grammar (e.g., Greenfield, Smith, & 
Laufer, in press; Ingram 1971). There has been an impressive consistency 
among subjects in different investigations in the use of word order and in 
the semantics of early sentences. It has also been possible to use one or 
another linguistic theory to describe something of both aspects of early 
child speech. However, it has become increasingly apparent that there is 
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variation in child language as well-variation in the speech of the same 
child across time as a function of development, as one would expect, but 
also variation in the speech of different children learning the same language, 
when average utterance length is held constant (Bloom 1970). The varia- 
tion among different children is such that in the several longitudinal studies 
of small numbers of children (usually less than five) in the 1960s, investi- 
gators were cautious about pooling the speech data from different children, 
and results were usually reported for subjects individually. 
Two descriptions of early child speech came out of the research in the 
early 1960s: "pivot grammar" (Braine 1963), and "telegraphic speech" 
(Brown & Fraser 1963). Pivotal utterances were those in which a constant 
function form such as "more" or "there" was juxtaposed with many different 
substantive forms, such as "cookie," "read," and "airplane." Telegraphic 
utterances contained two or more substantive forms and omitted the linking 
morphemes (e.g., "Mommy chair"). The two descriptions of early child 
speech appeared to be contradictory in that function forms were of central 
importance for defining pivot speech, whereas telegraphic speech was de- 
scribed as consisting only of substantive forms. However, it now appears 
that these superficial descriptions of early child speech may reflect both the 
structure of child language and the variation that exists within and among 
child speakers. 
STRUCTURE IN CHILD LANGUAGE 
In the present study, speech data from four children were examined 
in order to discover (1) categories of semantic-syntactic relations between 
words in the earliest multiword utterances and (2) the lexical represen- 
tation of sentences in different categories-without attempting to tie the data 
to one or another theoretical framework. The results that are presented here 
suggest that the ability to say sentences depends upon the child's learning 
something of an abstract system of semantic-syntactic structure, a grammar, for representing linguistically what he already knows about events in the 
world. 
The term "structure" can be defined on three levels for child language 
according to the results of this study. At the level of the sentence, two or 
more constituents can be combined so that the meaning of each of the con- 
stituents is somehow augmented by their combination, and structure is in- 
ferred when that meaning relation is repeated with different constituents 
and in different situations. Further, structure in the development of a par- 
ticular child is demonstrated by the predictability of one part of the lin- 
guistic system given knowledge of another part-at any one time, and in 
the course of development. Finally, on the most general level, structure in 
child language is defined by the regularities and consistencies among dif- 
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ferent children, both at the same time with mean length of utterance held 
constant, and in sequential development. 
The conclusion that children learn grammatical structure in order to 
combine two or more words was based upon two kinds of evidence. First, 
verb relations were of central importance in the children's learning, and the 
sequence of development of different verb categories was similar,for all the 
children. There were regularities in the ways in which verbs were related 
to other constituents in sentences, and groups of verbs functioned similarly 
to one another in their relation to other sentence constituents. For example, 
one group of verbs (intransitive) was related to animate nouns that speci- 
fied movers in an action that changed their spatial location (e.g., "go," "sit," 
etc.), and another group of verbs (transitive) was related to animate nouns 
that specified agents in an action that affected another object by changing 
its location (e.g., "put"). The regularity and consistency among utterances 
with such different verbs as "go," "sit," "stand up," etc., in contrast with 
other utterances with different verb relations, indicated that the children 
had made inductions about the possibilities for combining words with simi- 
lar and different meaning relations between them. Moreover, the fact that 
the same words (e.g., animate nouns) could function differently in relation 
to different kinds of verbs (e.g., as agents and movers) was taken as evi- 
dence that the children had made higher-order linguistic inductions about 
superordinate grammatical categories. 
Second, there was a systematic variation among the children in the 
kind of lexical representation in their utterances. Although the speech of all 
four children was semantically similar-they talked about the same kinds of 
things and in similar sequence in the course of development-they used 
either of two alternative strategies for learning syntax in order to represent 
the same information. The internal consistency in the system used by each 
child and the predictable development that followed was taken as further 
evidence that the children's multiword utterances were derived from under- 
lying rules of grammar. 
The description of the emergence of grammar that is presented here is 
consistent with the view put forth elsewhere (Bloom 1970, 1973) that chil- 
dren learn language as a means of representing or coding information that 
they have already acquired about objects, events, and relations in the world. 
Language development, in this view, follows from and depends upon con- 
ceptual development in a logical way-as traditionally argued by Piaget 
(1954) and Werner and Kaplan (1963), and affirmed more recently by 
Brown (1973), Schlesinger (1971), and Slobin (1971). An extensive argu- 
ment against the counterclaim that children's linguistic knowledge consists 
of a set of innate grammatical relations that are there somehow from the 
beginning to guide and determine linguistic development (as per McNeill 
1970) is presented in Bloom (1973). 
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THE VARIATION PARADIGM 
The study of linguistic variation typically has been concerned with de- 
scribing the effects of linguistic context or extralinguistic factors that are 
sociologically or geographically determined on different aspects of language 
use (e.g., Bailey 1973; Labov 1963, 1969; Sankoff & Cedergren 1971, and 
Sankoff & Laberge 1971). The source of linguistic variation in the child- 
speech data that have been described so far in the literature (from children 
of middle-class and generally college-educated parents) is neither cultural 
nor social. Although it may be environmentally conditioned to the extent 
that it reflects differences in parent interaction styles (Nelson 1973), it is 
more likely that variation in child speech is a function of individual cog- 
nitive development in interaction with different aspects of the linguistic code. 
Although both the kind of variation to be described here and its con- 
ditioning factors are different from those described in studies of sociolin- 
guistic variation (see Sankoff 1972), the problems are very nearly the same. 
In both instances it is necessary to observe a large number of behaviors 
so as to be able to make inferences and to generalize. However, in socio- 
linguistic studies one generalizes about a particular linguistic community, 
whereas in child language one makes inferences about the linguistic knowl- 
edge of an individual child. Given a large enough sample of observations, 
it is possible to discover patterns and relationships at one time that can then 
be compared with observations of the same child at a later time, and with 
observations of other children. 
In order to demonstrate the patterns of variability as well as the regu- 
larities and consistencies in child speech, it is necessary to collect and pro- 
cess sufficient data to assure that the evidence will be accountable for the 
resulting descriptions. A single instance of behavior, although interesting in 
its own right, can assume importance only if it shares certain properties with 
a large enough portion of all the data. Accordingly, one needs clear evi- 
dence, and in sufficient quantity, to allow for meaningful comparisons among 
behaviors so that similarities and differences can be revealed, both within 
the language of an individual child and across different children. In pre- 
senting the evidence from this study, frequency and proportion measures 
will be used to demonstrate the relevant interactions.1 
1 The issue of formalization has not been addressed in the present study. Even- 
tually, as data from more children are available, the taxonomic account presented 
here will need to be formalized with a scheme of semantic-syntactic rules, or 
grammar, that will represent both the regularities and the systematic variation in 
child language. 
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II. SUBJECTS AND PROCEDURES 
The subjects of the study-Eric, Gia, Kathryn, and Peter-are firstborn 
children of college-educated parents. They were each visited in their homes 
at periodic intervals, and their speech was recorded along with descriptions 
of relevant nonlinguistic context and behavior using the procedures de- 
scribed in Bloom (1970, pp. 234-239). Eric, Gia, and Kathryn were each 
visited every 6 weeks over several days by Bloom. Peter was visited every 
3 weeks by Lightbown and Hood. Figure 1 presents a description of the 
children in terms of mean length of utterance (MLU) (in morphemes); in 
the time period represented in the present study the children progressed 
from the period of single-word utterances to mean length of utterance of 
2.5 morphemes,2 and from age 19 months to 26 months. Table 1 describes 
the data base in terms of the numbers of utterances that were processed for 
each child. 
RELIABILITY OF LINGUISTIC INTERPRETATION 
The recorded observation sessions were transcribed, preserving as much 
of the information from the original behavioral events as possible. In the 
analysis to be presented here, a tentative description was made of a portion 
of the recorded data, and then successively larger and larger portions of the 
data were examined in order to test the consistency and regularity of the 
2 The MLU was used as an index of linguistic maturity so that the children 
could be compared with one another in the course of the longitudinal study and 
with other children who have been described in the literature (see, in particular, 
Brown 1973). All separable morphemes were counted in the first 100 utterances of 
each sample. Immediate self-repetitions, wholly or partially unintelligible utter- 
ances, and fragments of songs and rhymes were not counted. Imitative utterances, 
where the child repeated an adult utterance with five or fewer intervening child 
or adult utterances without changing the model except to reduce it by leaving 
something out, were not counted or processed in this study but are described in 
Bloom, Hood, and Lightbown (1974). 
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original description. Repeated passes through the recorded data, then, con- 
sisted of successive hypothesis testings: as questions were generated, the 
data were examined in order to answer the questions, the questions were 
revised, the data reexamined in order to answer the revised questions, and 
so on. Bloom (1974) has discussed the rationale that underlies an analysis 
in which categories of description are derived from a set of data in this way, 
TABLE 1 
SUMMARY DESCRIPTION OF SPEECH SAMPLESa 
Child Age 
and (Months, Syntactic Utterance Syntactic Utterance 
Time Hours Weeks) MLU Types Tokens 
Eric: 
I.... 4 19,1 1.10 10 16 
II .... 6.7 20,2 1.19 37 48 
III.... 7 22,0 1.42 108 165 
IV.... 8 23,2 1.69 401 504 
V..... 8 25,1 2.63 902 1,056 
Gia: 
I.... 7 19,2 1.12 55 100 
II.... 6.7 20,2 1.34 226 341 
III.... 8 22,1 1.58 288 451 
IV.... 8 23,3 1.79 457 671 
V..... 7.5 25,2 2.30 842 1,071 
Kathryn :b 
I.... 5.5 21,0 1.32 226 284 
II.... 5.5 22,3 1.89 767 896 
III.... 6.7 24,2 2.83 1,443 1,777 
Peter: 
I.... 3 21,1 1.04 7 7 
II.... 3.5 21,3.5 1.09 5 7 
III.... 4.5 22,2 1.37 70 150 
IV.... 4.5 23,1 1.41 80 149 
V.... 3 23,2.5 1.33 81 258 
VI.... 4.5 24,1 1.75 243 420 
VII.... 4.5 25,0 2.39 458 643 
aThe total data base consisted of 24,711 spontaneous utterances-both single-word and multiword tokens. 
Only spontaneous tokens were counted for the present study. See Bloom et al. (1974) for comparison of spon- 
taneous and imitative utterances. 
b The data processed for Kathryn represent only part of the total corpus collected for the longitudinal study 
and reported in Bloom (1970). 
in contrast with an analysis that imposes a preconceived scheme for de- 
scription on data. She pointed out that analysis based on a priori categories 
of description will necessarily fail to capture important distinctions in the 
data if distinctions that are present in the data do not correspond to the 
categories in the preconceived scheme. 
Each multiword utterance was examined and the semantic-syntactic re- 
lations among words were identified by observing the relationship between 
the utterance and aspects of the child's behavior and the situational context 
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in which the utterance occurred. Obviously, one cannot be confident that 
the semantic interpretation given to an utterance by an adult does indeed 
equal the child's semantic intent. At the least, it is necessary to establish 
that (1) any utterance can be identified as a separate behavior (from the 
other linguistic behaviors that occur) by other observers, and (2) given the 
same information about the utterance and nonlinguistic context and behav- 
ior, different observers can assign the same interpretation to it. 
Identifying the utterances occurred at the level of transcription. All of 
the transcription was done immediately after the recordings were made. 
The linguistic record was transcribed in traditional orthography, with pho- 
netic notation used in cases where speech could not be discriminated. Non- 
linguistic information about the context of each utterance was included in 
the transcription, and a standardized notation convention was used for re- 
cording the interaction between utterances and situations (Bloom, Light- 
bown, & Hood 1973). The following procedures were used to establish con- 
fidence in the transcriptions. All of the Peter data were transcribed by one 
investigator (either Lightbown or Hood) and subsequently checked by the 
other until agreement between them was established in the transcript. In 
the few cases where agreement could not be reached, the utterance was con- 
sidered unintelligible. All of the Kathryn, Eric, and Gia data were tran- 
scribed by Bloom. Samples of 100 utterances from the data of Kathryn at 
Time III, Eric at Time V, and Gia at Time V were retranscribed by Hood 
and then compared with Bloom's original transcription of the same utter- 
ances. The proportion of agreement between the two transcriptions (each 
utterance scored as same or different) was .97 for Kathryn III, .95 for 
Eric V, and .98 for Gia V. 
Interpretation of each speech event was made by at least two of the 
three investigators for all of the data. A comparison was made of the cate- 
gorization of 100 utterances from Kathryn at Time II by two investigators, 
with an independent categorization of the same utterances by the third in- 
vestigator. In the 100 utterances, 110 semantic-syntactic relations were iden- 
tified, and the proportion of agreement on the categorization of these rela- 
tions was .89. 
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III. RESULTS 
THE SEMANTIC-SYNTACTIC CATEGORIES 
The semantic-syntactic relations between two or more constituents 
could be identified for .88 of all the multiword utterances in the data. Cate- 
gories of relations emerged with the regular and increasing occurrence of 
utterances encoding these relations in the speech of all the children; the 
categories were not a superimposed a priori system of analysis. By exam- 
ining each speech event (which included the utterance, and behaviors by the 
child and others relative to the utterance) and considering its relation to 
other speech events in terms of similarities and differences, it was possible 
to identify categories of utterances that presumably derived from an individ- 
ual child's own rule system and were, therefore, functional for the child. 
Judging the psychological reality of the categorization scheme for each child 
depended upon the extent to which the individual categories were produc- 
tive in the linguistic behavior of the child. Accordingly, a criterion of pro- 
ductivity was established to support the assumption that the categories which 
were derived from the children's behavior did indeed represent their under- 
lying linguistic knowledge: a semantic-syntactic category was considered 
productive (i.e., derived according to an underlying rule system) if five 
or more utterance types were observed in the category in the data from a 
particular child in a particular sample.3 
Among the categories that emerged from the data were seven cate- 
gories of verb relations and the category of possession which formed the 
basis for the present discussion of structure and variation in child language. 
These were the categories in which reference could be made to relationships 
3 The criterion of productivity (five or more utterances) was a more stringent 
requirement in the Peter data than in the data from the other children inasmuch 
as the total number of hours at each time was always smaller for Peter than for 
the other children. 
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between persons and objects, and in which a developmental interaction be- 
tween form and meaning was revealed. In possession, the children made 
reference to objects that were within the domains of particular persons by 
virtue of habitual use or association. The criterial features that identified 
speech events in categories of verb relations were as follows: verb cate- 
gories were distinguished (whether or not an actual verb form appeared in 
the utterance) according to whether or not relevant movement accompanied 
the utterance (action vs. state events), and whether or not place was rele- 
vant to either action or state (locative vs. nonlocative events). The distinc- 
tion between action and locative verb relations is similar to the semantic 
distinction among verbs of motion that do and do not involve change of lo- 
cation for adults described by Miller (1972). 
The categories are defined and illustrated below. Further examples 
from each child at each time are presented in the Appendix. 
Action 
Utterances in this category referred to two kinds of movement where 
the goal of the movement was not a change in the location of an object or 
person (see Locative Action). 
1. Utterances referred to action that affected an object with movement 
by an agent. At least two of the three components of an action relation 
(agent-action-object) had to be represented in the utterance in order for the 
utterance to be included within the category. For example:4 
AFFECTED 
AGENT ACTION OBJECT 
P VII (Peter trying to open box) my open that 
K III (Kathryn opening drawer) . . open drawer 
G III (Gia going to her bike, Gia ... bike]5 
and then getting on) Gia ride bikeJ 
E IV (Eric has just reassembled train) I made . 
4 Examples of speech events are identified according to the sample in which 
they occurred; Roman numerals identify successive samples from each of the chil- 
dren, and the children are identified by first initial. Thus, P VII is the sample of 
speech from Peter at Time VII. Information in parentheses on the left identifies the 
context; the child's utterance is on the right, here arrayed according to constituents. 
5 Note that "Gia bike" might have alternative interpretations. In such cases, 
preceding and succeeding utterances were examined in an effort to determine the 
semantic-syntactic category to which the utterance would be assigned. If another 
utterance in the immediate context appeared to be a completion of the utterance 
in question or to otherwise disambiguate it, as in this case, the utterance could be 
assigned to a semantic-syntactic category. If not, it was classed as equivocal. 
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2. Other action utterances referred to movements by actors (persons or 
objects) in events where no object other than the actor was affected. For 
example: 
ACTOR ACTION 
K II (Kathryn has just jumped) Kathryn jumps 
P VI (Peter watching reels of tape recorder) tape go round 
Locative Action 
Utterances in this category referred to movement where the goal of 
movement was a change in the location of a person or object. 
1. Most locative actions entailed an agent, an affected object or person, 
and place or the goal of the movement. At least two of the four components 
(agent-action-object-place) had to be represented in the utterance in order 
for it to be included in the locative action category. For example: 
Loc. 
AGENT ACTION OBJECT PLACE 
K II (Kathryn throwing car and truck in 
box) ... put ... in box 
P VI (Peter putting masking tape on toy 
car) ... ... tape on there 
E V (Eric holds out hand to have Lois put 
puppet on it) you put ... a finger 
G V (Gia had put polo shirts on Mommy's 
bed) I'm put polo shirt on there 
2. Where the agent and affected object or person were the same, the 
single constituent was designated as mover. For example: 
Loc. 
MOVER ACTION PLACE 
G IV (Gia wants Mommy to get balloon from 
ceiling) Mommy stand up a chair 
P VI (Peter has been playing piano; he stops 
and turns around on bench) I get down . 
Locative State 
Utterances in this category referred to the relationship between a 
person or object and its location, where no movement established the lo- 
cative relation within the context of the speech event, that is, before, during, 
or after the child's utterance. Locative states entailed a person or object 
located, and place. At least two of the three components (object-state- 
place) had to be represented in the utterance in order for the utterance 
to be included in the locative-state category. For example: 
11 
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P VI (Peter pointing to overhead light in 
hallway) 
G V (Gia looking for toy bag) 
K III (Kathryn looking at picture of dog on 
chair) 
E V (Eric on Mommy's chair) 
OBJECT Loc. STATE 
light 





Utterances in this category referred to attention to a person, object, or 
event, and necessarily included a verb of notice (such as "see" or "hear"), 
since such events as seeing or hearing could not be identified by aspects of 
context and behavior. For example: 
G IV (Lois talking to Gia's Mommy) 
E V (Eric looking out window) 
K III (Children shouting in hallway) 

















Utterances in this category made reference to transitory states of affairs 
involving persons or other animate beings: either (1) an internal state, 
usually with a verb form such as "like," "need," or "want": 
P VI (Peter standing next to cabinet where pretzels are kept) 
E III (Lois has said she was going to take Eric's book home) 
G IV (Lois asked, "Did Caroline come to your party?") 
I want pretzel 
a need book 
Caroline sick 
or (2) a temporary state of ownership or possession: 
K III (Kathryn taking train from Lois) 
E V (Eric giving toy to another child) 
I have it 
you have it 
Utterances which made reference to external states of affairs included: 
G V (Gia looking out window with sunglasses on) it's dark outside 
Intention 
Two verb categories, intention and causality, emerged in the later 
samples and were distinguished from the others in that each involved two 
verb forms: a constituent verb in one of the categories already described, 
and a matrix verb that expressed either intention or causality relative to the 
constituent. Verbs of notice also functioned as matrix verbs in the later data, 
for example, "I see two bus come there" (E V). The expression of causal 
relations, for example, "make am sit down" (K II), did not become pro- 




. . . 
on chair 
. . . 
BLOOM, LIGHTBOWN, AND HOOD 
Utterances in the intention category included variants of such verbs as 
"want," "going to," "have to," "let's" in combination with an action, locative 
action, or-occasionally-a state verb. The utterances most often made ref- 
erence to action or locative-action events which in fact occurred immedi- 
ately following the utterance or which the child appeared to intend or desire. 
Almost without exception, the child was the agent of the subsequent event. 
For example, 
K III (Kathryn picked up lavaliere microphone) I want a wear this 
G V (Gia's nose is running; Lois gets a tissue and Gia is 
reaching for it) I want a blow nose 
K III (Kathryn and Lois having a tea party) I gon' cut as some more 
(then Kathryn pretends to cut cake) 
The Remaining Categories 
The categories of existence (simply pointing out or naming an object), 
negation (e.g., nonexistence, disappearance or rejection of objects or events), 
recurrence (reference to "more" or another instance of an object or event), 
and attribution (counting, specifying or otherwise qualifying objects) in- 
cluded utterances that made reference to objects primarily, and are discussed 
in Bloom et al. (1974). Other categories that emerged in the later data were 
wh-question, and relations that were subordinate to action verb relations: 
dative (specifying the recipient of an action that also involved an affected 
object), instrument (specifying the inanimate object that was used in an 
action to affect another object), and place. The category place included 
utterances that specified where an action event occurred, for example, "baby 
swim bath" (E V) and "buy more grocery store" (K II), in contrast with 
locative action where the goal of the movement was a change in location, 
for example, "put man block" (K II). The categories that were either not 
productive or did not manifest systematic developmental change were 
stereotype, routine, greeting, vocative, manner, time, affirmation, and con- 
junction. Finally, utterances that could not be assigned to any one category 
were judged equivocal (when more than one categorization was possible), 
anomalous (when the relation between utterance and context was contra- 
dictory), or otherwise undetermined. The absolute and proportional fre- 
quencies of utterance types in each of these categories that resulted from 
the linguistic analysis are presented in the section that follows. 
The results of the linguistic analysis consist of (1) the sequence in 
which the above semantic-syntactic categories appeared in the develop- 
mental data, and (2) the development of pronominal and nominal lexical 
representation in multiword utterances. After presenting the results of the 
sequence of development and the pronominal-nominal variation in develop- 
ment, the findings will be discussed in terms of (a) explanations of sequen- 
tial development, (b) semantic-syntactic structure in child language, and 
(c) variation in child language. 
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SEQUENCE OF DEVELOPMENT 
More than 20 categories of semantic-syntactic relationships in multi- 
word utterances were identified in the data from the four children in the 
period from single words to MLU of approximately 2.5 morphemes. Table 2 
presents the absolute and proportional frequencies of utterance types in 
each of the categories. An utterance with one relation was counted only 
one time in table 2 regardless of how many times it occurred in a speech 
sample, if the semantic interpretation of the utterance was the same each 
time it occurred. If the interpretation was different, the homonymous utter- 
ances were counted in different categories. Thus, the frequencies of seman- 
tic-syntactic relations in utterance types, not tokens, are represented in the 
categories in table 2. When two relations occurred in the same utterance 
(e.g., "eat Mommy cookie"; action-affected object plus possession), both 
relations were counted, and the utterance was represented two times in 
table 2. The proportion of different utterance types with more than one 
semantic-syntactic relation increased developmentally from none in the 
earliest samples, to .19 at Eric V, .11 at Gia V, .12 at Kathryn III, and .07 
at Peter VII. 
The verb categories in combination with the categories of possession, 
attribution, existence, negation, and recurrence accounted for an average of 
.77 of the semantic-syntactic relations in the utterances from all of the chil- 
dren. In addition, an average of .04 of the relations were in the categories 
wh-question, instrument, dative, and action-plus-place; and an average of 
.07 were in those categories that showed no developmental change (stereo- 
type, vocative, etc.). 
Generally, the absolute frequencies of utterance types increased in all 
categories for each child across time (see table 2). For the combined verb 
categories proportional frequency tended to increase as well, but for the 
combined categories existence, recurrence, and negation, proportional fre- 
quency tended to decrease. Thus, although there were always larger num- bers of different utterances as the children matured, utterances that made 
reference to the interactions between persons and objects or between objects increased proportionally, while there was a proportional decrease in utter- 
ances that made reference to an object with respect to itself or its class 
(except for attributives). Given these proportional interactions, it was con- 
cluded that the categories of existence, nonexistence, and recurrence were 
an earlier development, and the verb categories were a later development for all of the children. 
The category of possession accounted for .10 or less of the relations in 
each child's speech at each time, and an average of .04 for all of the children 
in all of the data. However, this category tended to be less important in the 
early data and to increase developmentally with all of the children. The 
attribution category was different for different children; although absolute 
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PROPORTION AND NUMBER OF DIFFERENT SEMANTIC-SYNTACTIC RELATIONS IN EACH SAMPLEa 
ERIC GIA KATHRYN PETER 
CATEGORY I I II IV V I II III IV V I II III I II III IV V VI VII 
Action ......10 (1) .18 (7) .20 (22) .16 (68) .20 (219) .06 ( 3 ) .11 (23) .35 (101) .35 (173) .32 (307) .24 (56) .21 (174) .24 (393) .43 (3) .40 (2) .10( 7) .23 (23) .35 (28) .14 (39) .17 (81 Locativeaction .03 (1) .06 (7) .09 (32) .09 (96) .06 ( 3) .06 (12) .12 (36) .13 (67) .09 (87) .06 (15) .13 (108) .12 (192) .14 (1) .06 ( 4) .05 (4) .17 (14) .12 (33) .15 (71) Locative state. .03 (1) .. .05 (21) .02 (24) ... .00 ( 1) .04 (12) .02 (10) .03 (30) .02 ( 4) .05 ( 38) .04 ( 67) .. . .03 (2) .01 (1) ... .05 (13) .06 (30) State....... 05 (2) .09 (10) .05 (20) .07( 81) .02 ( 1) .. .03( 9) .01( 4) .03( 26) .04 ( 9) .05 ( 38) .06 (106) .. .. .. .01 (1) .01 ( 1) .01 ( 4) .04 (18) Notice ......10 (1) .03 (1) .03(3) .01(5) .06(69) .. .01 (3) . .00k 2) .01(13) .01(3) .01(12) .01 (20) ...03 (2) .0111) ....02 (t6) .01(3) Intention .... .01 (16).. .01( 4) .01( 4) .14 (135) .02( 5) .01 (11) .07 (115) .. 
... .
. .. .01( 7) Existence......30 (3) .15 (6) .15 (16) .07 (31) .06 (64) .23 (12) .13 (26) .06 (17) .03 (13) .03 ( 30) .04 (9) .08 (68) .07 (109) ... .20 (1) .07 ( 5) .03 ( 2) .05 ( 4) .04 (10) .07 (34) Negation .....10 (1) .15 (6) .17 (18) .05 (24) .05 (56) .02 ( 1) .02 ( 4) .01 (2) .01 (7) .04 ( 42) .06 (14) .05 (41) .03 (54) .. . 04 ( 3) .05 ( 4) .02 ( 2) .04 (10) .02 ( 9) Recurrence ...... 05 (2) .07 ( 8) .15 (65) .03 (31) .09 ( 5) .20 (40) .06 (18) .02 (10) .03 ( 24) .08 (19) .03 (26) .03 (44) .14 (1) .40 (2) :24 (17) .16 (13) .12 (10) .04 (12) .06 (31) Possession.... .. . . 03 ( 3) .00 ( 2) .02 (18) .02 (1) .03 ( 7) .07 (19) .08 (40) .10 ( 91) .06 (15) .06 (51) .09 (141) .. .. .07 (5) .05 ( 4) .01 ( 1) .04 (12) .06 (27) Attribution ...... 03 (1) .05 ( 5) .11 (46) .10 (113) .. .03 ( 6) .05 (15) .13 (67) .10 ( 95) .18 (41) .09 (78) .07 (116) .29 (2) .. 10 (7) .18 (14) .12 (10) .16 (45) .06 (31) Wh-question... .. ... 02 ( 2) .00 ( 1) .05 (54) .. .. .. .01 (3) .02 (19) ... .03 ( 23) .07 (116) .. .... 
... 
.04 (12) .03 (16) 
Placeb...... . . 05 (2) .. .02 (9) .02(20) .02 (1) .01(2) .01( 2) .01( 6) .01( 8) ... .02 (14) .00( 3) . . . .10(7) .05 (4) .05 (4) .02 (6) .04 (19) Action and place .01.. .(1I) .01(3) .01( 7) ... .03(6) .01( 2) .02( 12) .02(15) ... .00( 3) .00( 8) .. .. ... ... ... ... .01 (6) Dative ......... ... .02(9) .01(14) ... .. 01( 4) .01( 5) .01 (2) .01( 6) .01(10) ...... ... .01 (3) Instrument .... .. . .01( 5) .. .00( 2) .. .. .01(1) ... .. Othere .10(1) ~.10 (4) .02 ( 2) .05 (22) .08( 93) .30 (16) .13 (26) .04 (11) .06( 31) .00 (4) .07 (26) .06 (50) .03 (58) . . .. 03 (2) ... .18(5) 1156 Equivocal...... .... .00( 4) .04(2) .02 (5) .04(11) .02(11) .00( 2) .01 (2) .01(11) .00( 7) . . .. 01(1) ... .. 
Anomalous/ 
undetermined .30 (3) .15 (6) .10 (11) .16 (66) .12 (131) .15( 8) .20 (40) .11( 33) .07( 35) .01 (12) .09 (22) .09( 79) .05( 83) ...10( 7) .11( 9) .09( 7) .10 (28) .10 (48) 
Total N of 
Relations.. 10 39 108 424 1110 53 201 292 499 950 232 833 1642 7 5 70 80 81 281 490 
aProportions are rounded to nearest hundredth. Those less than .005 are given as .00. 
bMultiword utterances that specified only place. 
Stereotype, routine, greeting, vocative, conjunction, affirmation, manner, and time. 
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frequency tended to increase for all the children, no clear trend emerged 
for proportional frequencies. 
Utterances in the categories instrument and dative emerged only in the 
later data, as can be seen in table 2. Even though children are no doubt 
aware that (1) persons can be affected by certain actions that also involve 
other objects (e.g., as receivers), and (2) there are particular instruments 
for specific actions (e.g., pencils, crayons, spoons, keys), the children in this 
study simply did not talk about these kinds of relations in their early syn- 
tactic utterances. For the present study, wh-questions were identified only 
by their form; further semantic-syntactic analysis of the development of 
questions in child language is in progress. 
In the category action-plus-place, place was not a complement con- 
stituent in an action relation as it was in locative relations, since the comple- 
ment of an action verb does not depend on specifying place to complete the 
meaning of the verb (e.g., "write" and "play") as is the case with locative- 
action verbs (e.g., "go" and "put"). The category action-plus-place did not 
become productive until after the locative-action category was productive. 
The children did not produce such utterances as "those children doing 
there" (K III) or "orange chair read a book" (G V) until after such utter- 
ances as 
"put man a block" (K II) and "wrench go there" (E IV) were 
fully productive. This result is consistent with a report of similar develop- 
ment in Italian by Parisi (1974). 
Sequence of the Development of Verb Relations 
The development of verbs was central to the elaboration of structure 
after the emergence of two-word utterances, and the verb relations devel- 
oped sequentially and similarly among the children. All of the other seman- 
tic-syntactic relationships between constituents were eventually subordinated 
to the verb relations: possessive, attributive, and recurrence relations were 
eventually embedded in predicate constituents; place, dative, instrumental, 
and negation relations were all constituents in verb matrices. The category 
existence was coded only when no other constituent relations occurred in 
an utterance. 
Given the criterion of productivity, five or more utterance types in a 
category, the following sequence emerged: encoding of action events pre- 
ceded encoding of stative events; and nonlocative relations were generally 
encoded before locative relations. As can be seen in table 2, the sequential 
development of verb categories for Eric and Peter was that action verb re- 
lations preceded locative-action verb relations and locative action preceded 
locative-state relations. The sequence of verb relations was somewhat dif- 
ferent for Kathryn and Gia: they also learned to encode action events before 
nonaction (stative) events, but they developed reference to action and lo- 
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cative-action events at the same time. For all of the children, there was no 
developmental difference between the two kinds of action events with tran- 
sitive (taking an agent) and intransitive (taking an actor) verbs; the num- 
ber of intransitives was quite small in all instances. There were differences 
between locative-action transitive and intransitive verbs (with agents and 
movers, respectively) in grammatical complexity (described in Bloom, Mil- 
ler, & Hood, in press), but not in the sequence or relative frequency of occur- 
rence. Accordingly, the two subcategories of action and of locative action 
were combined here. 
The children also differed in their use of the verb "want" for expres- 
sion of state or intention. Kathryn and Gia used "want" overwhelmingly 
with a constituent verb (and often affected-object) immediately previous to 
an action to express intention to act. The category intention was more fre- 
quent for Kathryn and Gia than for Eric and Peter both proportionately and 
in absolute numbers of utterance types (see table 2). For Peter and Eric 
"want" was rarely used in combination with a constituent verb to express 
intention to act. In fact, intention was not a productive category until 
Eric V and Peter VII, and even in these later samples it comprised only .01 
of all the data for each of them (see table 2). Rather, "want" was used by 
Peter and Eric the way "need" was-with a noun-to express an internal 
state, such as "I want pretzel." 
Kathryn and Gia also used verbs other than "want" as matrix verbs in 
expressing intention (e.g., "gonna," "hafta"), and utterances in the category 
intention marked the beginning of two kinds of verb complexity. First, they 
were the first embedded sentences used by the children, and they were 
primitive in that the child was most often the agent of both the constituent 
and matrix verbs. Utterances such as "I want Lois button it" (K III) were 
rare, and utterances such as "I want comb hair" when the child wanted 
another to be the agent did not occur. The matrix verbs were used most 
often in situations where the child wanted to or was about to perform the 
action. Second, it appears that the matrix verbs ("want," "gonna," "hafta," 
"let's") in utterances in the category intention were used to express mood 
(intention to act) and were thus the beginning of the modal system. The 
only other modals were forms of negation, for example, "can't"; modals 
such as "will" and "can" did not occur. Notice verbs also began to appear as 
matrix verbs at the end of this period, for example, "a see Mommy busy" 
(K III). 
In sum, the sequence of development observed in the present study 
was as follows: the functional-relations existence, nonexistence, and recur- 
rence preceded development of verb relations. Within verb relations, action 
events (action and locative action) preceded state events (locative state, 
state, and notice), and action preceded locative action for two of the chil- 
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dren. The categories possession and attribution were variable among the 
children and appeared to be later developments for Eric and Peter. Other 
categories developed after the basic verb relations and included specifica- 
tion of instrument, the dative, wh-questions, and, for Kathryn and Gia, 
matrix verbs. 
PRONOMINAL-NOMINAL VARIATION 
Certain relational meanings in early sentences were defined in Bloom 
(1973) as functional relations: a constant form with specific meaning was 
combined with a number of different words, and the meaning of the constant 
form determined the meaning of the relation between the two words in 
combination. Brown (1973) has pointed out that such relations have the 
form f(x) with a fixed value, f, combined with a variable (x) that can 
assume many values. Such relational forms make reference across classes of 
objects and events-that is, many different kinds of things exist, disappear, 
and recur. Children can talk about such behaviors with respect to many ob- 
jects and events (such as cookies, airplanes, and tickling) that are themselves 
otherwise quite different from one another. 
These functional relations were observed in the speech of all the chil- 
dren: for example, "no," "gone," or "no more" signaled negation (most 
often nonexistence), and "more" or "nother" signaled recurrence. As ob- 
served in table 2, although the absolute frequencies in each of these cate- 
gories tended to increase developmentally, their proportional frequencies de- 
creased, leading to the conclusion that they were an earlier development 
than the verb categories for all of the children. Indeed, the functional rela- 
tions were the most frequent in the earlier samples when syntax first emerged. 
When mean length of utterance was less than 2.0, Eric and Peter con- 
tinued the same kind of functional relations to encode particular functions in action, location, and possession relations: the pro-forms "I" or "my" as 
agent or mover, "it," "this one," or "that" as affected-object, "my" as pos- 
sessor, and "here" or "there" as place. The structure that Peter and Eric 
learned, constant forms with constant functions, could be compared to a 
system of inflectional affixing or case marking which might be schematized 
as Ax = X, Bx = X, or Ay = Y, By = Y, where x and y are each constant re- 
lational forms that always mean the same thing relative to the different forms 
(A or B) with which they combine to create the relational meaning (X or Y). In this way, Peter and Eric were able to talk about a great many objects in 
action and locative relations, and syntax did not depend on lexical learning for making particular reference to different objects. However, Peter and Eric knew the names of many objects and persons. They used these nominal forms in single-word utterances and in functional relations with such words 
as "no" and "more." There was also a certain amount of variation with the 
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pronominal forms they learned to specify affected-object and place relation- 
ships (e.g., "this one" and "it," and "here," "right here," "over there," "there," 
etc.), as can be seen in the examples in the Appendix. Thus, it was not the 
case that the pronominal forms with verbs were unanalyzed phrases learned 
by rote. Reference to place and affected-object occurred independently of 
verbs, and verbs also occurred independently as well as occasionally with 
noun forms. 
The grammatical system that Peter and Eric learned consisted of rela- 
tions between different verb forms and a number of constant functional 
forms such as "it," "there," and "my." Successive verb relations were learned 
by fitting new categories (such as locative action and then locative state) 
into the existing system of reference or grammar. However, whereas refer- 
ence to affected-object (with "it," "this one," etc.) and place (with "here" 
or "there") included many different things and places, Eric and Peter re- 
ferred only to themselves as agents and possessors (with "I" or "my") and 
did not also talk about other people as agents and possessors when MLU 
was less than 2.0 morphemes. 
Within the same MLU period, Kathryn and Gia used the same kind of 
functional relations-constant forms in combination with many different 
forms-to represent the notions existence, nonexistence, and recurrence. How- 
ever, Kathryn and Gia encoded other grammatical relations with categories 
of nominal forms as agent, affected object, place, and possessor instead of 
a constant pronominal form for each grammatical relation. Thus, "Mommy," 
"Daddy," "Baby," "Kathryn," etc., formed a grammatical category agent. 
Such forms as "book," "cookie," "ball," "toy," "bag," etc., formed a gram- 
matical category affected-object; such forms as "table," "floor," "outside," 
"bag" formed a grammatical category place; affected-object and place were 
not mutually exclusive. The fact that Kathryn and Gia developed action, 
locative-action, and possession relations at the same time was interpreted as 
evidence that they had learned the superordinate grammatical categories 
sentence-subject (including agents, actors, movers, and possessors), predi- 
cate-object (including objects of actions, locative actions, and possession), 
and predicate-complement (place), so that a number of semantic distinc- 
tions could be encoded within the same grammatical system that specified 
the relations among categories of nominal forms. 
The relations between nominal categories in Kathryn's and Gia's speech 
could be schematized as A + B = C/D, where A and B were grammatical 
categories, and the relations between them, C or D, were superordinate 
category relationships with specific meaning, such as possession, action, or 
location. Kathryn and Gia learned an abstract grammatical structure here 
schematized as A + B, which could be used to represent several semantic 
distinctions, here schematized as C, D. The structure learned by Eric and 
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Peter was different but equally abstract in that it was used to represent a 
number of semantic distinctions with each distinction dependent upon a lin- 
guistic operator or marker. The two systems of pronominal and nominal en- 
coding are aspects of the adult model and, indeed, of language in general. 
All the children then were quite similar in their semantic knowledge, but 
there was variation among them in their knowledge of syntax-they were 
learning two different systems of semantic-syntactic structure that were vir- 
tually mutually exclusive in the beginning. There was an impressive consis- 
tency within each child and between Eric and Peter on the one hand and 
Kathryn and Gia on the other when MLU was less than 2.0. 
The major development when MLU passed 2.0 was a shift in encoding 
and the integration of the two alternative systems of pronominal and nomi- 
nal reference as presented in table 3 and figures 2 through 4. The figures 
represent proportional frequencies of pronominal encoding for agent and 
affected-object in action verb relations (figs. 2 and 3) for the four children, 
and possessor (fig. 4) for Kathryn and Gia.6 The graphic representation of 
nominal encoding would, of course, be the mirror image of figures 2 through 
4. As can be seen, even though the children started out (when mean length 
of utterance was approximately 1.3) with either one or the other linguistic 
system, there was a significant shift with development as both systems of 
reference were gradually integrated for all of the children. The occurrence 
of redundant coding (e.g., "fix it choo-choo train") occurred infrequently 
and only appeared in the data when MLU passed 2.0. Brown (1973) inter- 
preted such utterances as a failure to analyze and segment the "it" from the 
verb form. However, in the present study, such utterances seemed to repre- 
sent the children's attempt to learn the alternative forms of pronominal and 
nominal encoding in making the transition from one form of reference to the 
other. Also, Gia often said one form and then the other, especially for agents, 
for example, "Gia lie down/I lie down." Such redundancy, although gen- 
erally infrequent, occurred equally often in the speech of all of the children. 
The same developmental trends were apparent in the pronominal-nomi- 
nal interactions among constituents in locative-action relations. The data in 
table 3 confirm the distinction between action and locative-action verb rela- 
tions for Peter and Eric: action relations took pronominal forms as affected- 
object, but in locative-action relations Peter and Eric used nominal forms as 
affected-object (with pronominal place). Further, agents (with affected- 
object) and actors (which were also in a sense the objects affected by the 
action) were productive in action relations (P IV and E III) before refer- 
6 Peter and Eric did not make the same transition for possession in this time 
period because possession was a later development for both (see table 2). 
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TABLE 3 
PRONOMINAL AND NOMINAL ENCODING OF SENTENCE CONSTITUENTS 
ACTION LOCATIVE ACTION 
POSSESSION- Agent 
POSSESSOR Actor Affected-Object Agent Mover Affected-Object Place CHILD 
SAMPLE MLU Pro Nom Pro Nom Pro Nom Pro Nom Pro Nom Pro Nom Pro Nom 
Eric: 
II...... 1.19 
III...... 1.42 2 
IV...... 1.69 1 




II...... 1.34 1 6 
III...... 1.58 1 18 
IV...... 1.79 7 33 
V....... 2.30 61 30 
Kathryn: 
I ...... 1.32 2 13 
II...... 1.89 32a 34a 
III...... 2.83 104 38 
Peter: 
III ..... 1.37 2 3 
IV...... 1.41 4 
V ...... 1.33 1 ... 
VI...... 1.75 12 
VII...... 2.39 23 4 
1 4 2 
7 1 14 4 
12 4 32a 33a 









4 19 4 44 
9 99 41 81 










2 2 ... 2 
... 2 7 7 11 
20 ... 8 25 12 19 
... 1 ... 6 1 3 
... 7 ... 12 ... 15 
... 5 1 31 1 16 
8 4 22 22 8 18 
... 1 4 1 2 2 
2 12 6 28 22 25 











... ... .. ... 1 3 3 1 
1 ... ... ..... 4 
1 . .. 3 5 11 1 
... ... 2 1 7 10 18 4 
8 1 9 5 22" 9a 36a 7a 
a Included here are utterances with redundant coding, for example, "my Kathryn house" and "I fix it choochoo train." 
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ence to agents (that moved another object) or movers (that were also the 
objects that moved) became productive in locative-action relations (P VII 
and E IV), apparently because action relations developed first. 
Just before the pronominal-nominal shift there was a decrease in the 
proportional frequencies of utterances in the combined verb categories 
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FIGURE 2.-Pronominal encoding of agent and actor. The first data point for 
Peter represents the averaged data from Peter III, IV, and V, when MLU was vir- 
tually identical: -------- = Eric, = Peter, . = Kathryn, 
= Gia. 
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tional frequencies in the verb categories might have been the effect of the 
transition from one means of encoding to another. 
By the time MLU approached 2.5 morphemes, the variation among the 
children was greatly reduced. Kathryn and Gia had learned a primitive 
system of pronominal substitution for nominal categories, while Eric and 
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FIGURE 3.-Pronominal encoding of affected-object. The first data point for 
Peter represents the averaged data from Peter III, IV, and V, when MLU was vir- 
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FIGURE 4.-Pronominal encoding of possessor: 
= Gia. 
and possession. In terms of nominal and pronominal reference, the children 
were quite similar to one another when MLU approached 2.5 morphemes. 
No matter how they started out, affected-object was most often nominal and 
agent was most often pronominal for all four children. There was a crossover 
from predominantly pronominal to predominantly nominal encoding of af- 
fected object for Eric and Peter, and a crossover from predominantly nomi- 


















The children in this study learned more than word order and something 
about the meaning relations between words. The facts of child language 
appear to translate to case grammar terms in the meanings of word relations, 
and generative transformational grammar terms in the nature of the gram- 
matical relations between categories. However, it seems to be more profit- 
able to describe such facts of child language on their own terms, by iden- 
tifying and interpreting speech events according to shared features of situa- 
tional context and linguistic form rather than in terms of goodness of fit with 
one or another preconceived system of analysis or linguistic theory. 
The findings in the present study will be discussed here in terms of 
(a) explaining sequential development, (b) semantic-syntactic structure in 
child language, and (c) variation in child language. 
EXPLAINING SEQUENTIAL DEVELOPMENT 
There are several possible factors to explore in attempting to account 
for the sequence of development that was obtained, including relative fre- 
quency of exposure, syntactic complexity, semantic complexity, and cogni- 
tive complexity. 
Frequency of Exposure 
One possible explanation for the sequence of development in the chil- 
dren's speech was the relative frequency of utterances in the same cate- 
gories in the adult speech that the children heard in the course of develop- 
ment. A comparison of the adult- and child-relative frequencies in the verb 
categories in the present data revealed that they were indeed the same: 
action was more frequent than locative action, locative state, and notice, 
in that order. However, attributive and wh-questions were even more fre- 
quent than action relations in the adult speech, and these two categories 
were proportionally far less frequent in the child-speech data. Although 
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these interactions were more often between investigator and child than be- 
tween parent and child,7 one has the intuitive impression that attributives, 
wh-questions, and the dative are generally frequent in adult speech to chil- 
dren. Parents typically point out different books, toys, articles of clothing, 
foods, etc., on the basis of relative size, color, amount, etc. Parents and 
other adults also ask children many questions (Broen 1972; Snow 1972) 
and give such directions as "give me the ball" or "show it to Daddy." 
The parent-child data that have been reported in the literature indi- 
cate that the interaction between frequency of exposure and the sequence 
of development is quite complicated and that children do not learn different 
structures simply according to how often they hear them. If sufficient 
parent-speech data had been available in the present study, it might have 
been instructive to compare frequencies in the parent-speech data with the 
respective children's order of acquisition, as Brown (1973) did for the 
acquisition of grammatical morphemes. Brown reported that the sequence 
of development of morphological inflections in his data could not be ac- 
counted for by the relative frequency of the same forms in the mothers' 
speech. Rather than there being a simple causal relation between frequency in adult speech and order of acquisition, it is more likely that children ac- 
tively search for linguistic forms that can represent what they want to talk 
about. Once the child has realized that certain aspects of his environment 
are relatively constant with respect to his behavior and the behavior of 
others, he can learn to represent linguistically the conceptualizations he has 
formed of recurring events. No matter how frequently a structure occurs in 
the speech a child hears, he can ignore it if it is not relevant for the kinds of 
things he needs to say (see Bloom et al. [1974] for discussion of how chil- 
dren actively process linguistic messages for their language learning). 
Syntactic Complexity 
Brown (1973) has invoked a "law of cumulative complexity" (p. 185) 
to explain the sequence of development in child language: "A construction 
x + y may be regarded as more complex than either x or y because it in- 
volves everything involved in either of the constructions alone plus some- 
thing more" (p. 407). According to Brown, the order in which grammatical 
morphemes emerge in child speech can be accounted for in this way. It 
is also true for progressive syntactic complexity: three-term strings (subject- 
7 The use of investigator-child interaction was a deliberate feature of the re- 
search plan and was designed to reduce the variability in the data. It was reasoned 
that the greatest consistency would be attained in the data if all four children inter- 
acted with an investigator (rather than mother) primarily. For this reason, the 
intersubject variability in the data is all the more striking. As a result, however, the 
mother-child ata that were recorded were insufficient for extended analysis. 
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verb-object) do not appear until after two-term strings (subject-verb, verb- 
object, subject-object), and recurrence, possession, and attribution do not 
occur in verb relations until after they are productive separately. The other 
structures described in the present study were not explicitly accounted for 
by Brown according to an index of cumulative complexity in what he called 
Stage I, when MLU was less than 2.0. However, it does appear that syntac- 
tic complexity can explain the late emergence of matrix verbs which entail 
sentence embedding, the dative which entails two different kinds of rela- 
tions between persons and an object, and the instrumental which entails 
two kinds of agency. Indeed, these syntactic relations which children in the 
present study acquired later than the basic verb relations are perfect exam- 
ples of Brown's "something more"-a new element which must be added to 
syntactic configurations acquired earlier. 
However, there were other aspects of sequential development in the 
present study that did not fit the cumulative complexity explanation. The 
theory of cumulative syntactic complexity could neither describe nor explain 
the sequence of development of the early Stage I semantic-syntactic rela- 
tions observed in the present study. The "something more" criterion does 
not appear to explain the fact that verb relations developed after functional 
relations. Verb relations are quite similar to functional relations in that 
a particular action such as "eat" can apply across several different objects 
such as "cookies," "meat," "pretzels," etc., just as "more" or "gone" can 
refer to different objects and events. One might argue that verb relations 
entail an agent constituent as "something more," but although agents were 
productive for Gia and Kathryn from the beginning, they were not produc- 
tive with the earliest verb relations in the Stage I speech of Eric and Peter. 
For Eric and Peter, then, verb relations, although a later development, were 
not cumulatively more complex than functional relations. Locative relations 
involve "something more" (place) than action relations, but action and 
locative action appeared at the same time in Kathryn's and Gia's speech. 
The most obvious case in which cumulative complexity did not appear to 
be a factor was in the sequential development of encoding locative-action 
and locative-state events. If anything, locative state would seem to entail 
"something less" in that no agent was involved in affecting the spatial re- 
lation between object and place. 
Brown did not report a sequence of development of semantic-syntactic 
relations in Stage I speech. The data he presented were cross-sectional 
within that period to demonstrate the existence of the "major meanings" of 
Stage I speech. Although cumulative complexity is descriptive of certain 
transitions from Stage I to later speech-in particular, those structures that 
involve conjoining and embedding-there were other syntactic developments 





Bowerman (1973a) and Schlesinger (1971) have suggested that chil- 
dren have learned semantic relationships and have not learned grammatical 
relations when they put two and three words together-that early language 
learning is semantic rather than syntactic. Bowerman argued that there is 
insufficient evidence available to conclude that the subject-predicate gram- 
matical relationship exists in early child language and that the distinction 
involves more abstract linguistic inductions that are probably made later in 
development. The claim that children are learning only semantic structures, 
like the similar claim for syntax in early sentences in the 1960s, is only 
part of the story (see Bloom 1970). It has become increasingly clear in 
linguistic theory that semantics and syntax are mutually dependent and 
inseparable in any theory of grammar, and the two aspects of structure 
could not be separated in describing the child language observed in this 
study. Indeed, according to Bowerman (1973b), "The linguistic knowl- 
edge which underlies the earliest two- and three-word constructions may 
be no more complex than simple rules to order words which are under- 
stood as performing various semantic functions" (p. 210). Bowerman ap- 
pears to confuse the claim that children are learning only the semantics of 
sentences when she fails to consider word-order rules as manifesting knowl- 
edge of syntax. 
Both Bowerman and Schlesinger argued that evidence of word-order 
rules is not a sufficient condition for attributing knowledge of the subject- 
predicate distinction (which they seem to equate with grammar) to the 
child. In particular, Bowerman objected to the assumption of an under- 
lying subject-predicate structure in child language as "too abstract." The 
kind of evidence that both Bowerman and Schlesinger might accept in order 
to attribute such knowledge of grammatical relations to the child would be 
the occurrence of superordinate categories whereby words in the same syn- 
tactic position took on different semantic functions relative to one another. 
Such superordinate grammatical categories were manifest in the system of 
semantic-syntactic structure that Gia and Kathryn learned. That is, the 
same words (e.g., "Mommy" or "Baby") could have different grammatical 
meanings, such as Agent (in an action event), Mover (in a locative event), 
or Possessor, and different words (e.g., "chair," "floor," "box") could have 
the same grammatical function (place), etc. Indeed, the same kind of evi- 
dence seems also to appear among Bowerman's own data (1973a, pp. 237- 
292). Further, the alternative system learned by Peter and Eric, in this 
same period of time, was no less grammatical. Even though superordinate 
grammatical categories were not represented in their speech, the patterns of 
regularity in their speech provided evidence of an abstract linguistic struc- 
ture that was no less coherent and consistent. 
Bowerman pointed out that the syntactic tests of the reality of a sub- 
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ject-predicate distinction in the adult model (e.g., transformations such as 
the passive that operate the same way on constituents with different seman- 
tic functions) are not met in the evidence from child speech. However, the 
existence of a structure in child language needs to be justified by a test of the 
child-language data and not by tests that apply to adult-speech data. The 
critical issue is whether there is a syntactic structure-a system of rules for 
combining words-in the children's speech, and not whether one can iden- 
tify adult syntax in child sentences. 
An important distinction seems to have been blurred in the emphasis on 
semantic learning by Bowerman, Schlesinger, and others as well-the dis- 
tinction between semantic development and conceptual development. Chil- 
dren's early language learning is semantic, to be sure, which simply means 
that they have learned something about the meanings of words and the 
meaning relations between words. But how they have learned to think about 
the objects, events, and relations in their experience is something apart from 
how they have learned to represent such information in linguistic messages. 
Semantic learning has to do with learning a coding system for representing 
meaning in natural languages. Meaning derives from an individual's mental 
representation of experience. Semantic complexity cannot be separated from 
syntactic complexity-both represent the linguistic complexity that influences 
the course of development. On the other hand, one can look at cognitive 
complexity apart from linguistic complexity and attempt to specify the con- 
ceptual constraints that influence development. 
Cognitive Complexity 
According to Schlesinger (1971) and Slobin (1971) later linguistic 
developments are semantically more complicated because they are cogni- 
tively more complex. To a certain extent, that is obviously true. Cognitive 
complexity can be defined in terms of the mental operations that result in 
the mental representation of events (one's experience), and the extent of 
discrepancy between an original event in reality and the conceptual coding 
of that event (see the papers in Melton & Martin [1972] for various accounts 
of coding systems in human memory). For example, encoding action events 
occurred before encoding attribution in the present study, and it is reason- 
able that action on objects was cognitively simpler (involving sensorimotor 
schemas and patterns) than discriminating among similar objects according 
to relative size, color, or amount (which involves higher-level cognitive pro- 
cesses of categorization and seriation). On the other hand, the fact that en- 
coding locative-state relations did not occur until after encoding locative- 
action relations would appear to be evidence that relative cognitive complex- 
ity was not the only factor operating to determine developmental sequence. 
Placing an object relative to another point in the context (locative action) 
would entail the transformation of object A from place B to place C. Quite 
simply, in order to know to change the location of an object the child would 
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have to be aware that it is already located at B and it potentially can be 
located at C. Viewed in this way, a locative state might appear to be less 
cognitively complex than a locative action. 
Knowing about something does not simply translate to being able to 
talk about it or to understand when others talk about it. Children give every 
indication that they know the instrumental functions of crayons, keys, spoons, 
etc., and are aware of the function of persons as receivers in such events as 
giving, showing, kissing, etc., before these relations are represented in their 
syntactic speech. Even earlier, before the first sentences appear, children's 
linguistic behavior presents evidence that they are aware of relations among 
persons and objects and that objects can be located in space or otherwise 
acted upon (Bloom 1973; Greenfield et al., in press). While such aware- 
ness is a necessary condition for learning grammar, linguistic development 
is neither isomorphic with nor a necessary result of cognitive development. 
The distinction between cognitive categories or conceptual schemata, 
and linguistic categories, can be easily obscured. As the child acts on his 
environment and observes others acting on his environment in similar and 
different ways, he begins to organize his experiences. He develops schemata 
to represent mentally such relations among objects as persons acting on 
objects, persons habitually associated with objects, the relative location of 
objects, persons changing the location of objects, etc. Such cognitive sche- 
mata are general and nonspecific to particular persons or objects, having 
been formed on the basis of many encounters with different persons and 
objects. With each schema, the child has induced a regularity in the inter- 
actions among persons and objects so that future encounters with events can 
be recognized and incorporated in cognitive memory. Such cognitive cate- 
gories represent the entire relationship among, for example, agent, action 
and object, or possessor and possessed. 
The child does not need to know anything about words and word 
meanings in order to form such cognitive schemata. Children learn such 
abstract object relationships and then need to learn how the words that they 
hear and perhaps already know in a lexical sense can take on meanings in 
relation to one another for more extended messages about particular events. 
A linguistic category is formed by those words that come together in the 
language because they can mean the same thing relative to other words, 
for example, "Mommy," "Daddy," and "Baby" as agent in the relation to 
"table," "chair," "floor" as place; or "eat," "turn," "push" as action in relation 
to "it" as affected-object. Such differentiated semantic categories as agent, 
place, affected object, etc., are linguistic inductions that the child has made 
on the basis of his linguistic experience relative to existing relations in cog- 
nitive schemata; the meaning relationship between linguistic categories is 
determined by a semantic-syntactic structure. Although relative cognitive 
complexity is a factor in explaining linguistic development, it appears to function to determine linguistic development only in complex interaction 
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with the linguistic code that the child is learning. Slobin (1971) has dis- 
cussed how cognitive development can interact with linguistic complexity to 
determine developmental differences and similarities among children learn- 
ing different languages (see, also, Macnamara 1972). 
The Cycle of Actions and States in Cognitive-Linguistic Development 
The encoding of action and locative-action relations appeared to be 
sandwiched between the encoding of two kinds of stative events in the 
sequence of linguistic development. Existence, nonexistence, and recurrence 
were often stative and did not necessarily involve action by the child or 
others; locative state, state, and notice were the stative events that were en- 
coded after action events. However, what appears at first glance to be a 
discontinuity in linguistic development may result from the primacy of 
actions over states in the interaction between cognitive and linguistic de- 
velopment. The sequence of linguistic development of semantic-syntactic 
relations appears to recapitulate the cycle of deriving knowledge of states 
from knowledge gained through action or the perception of movement. 
In early infancy, the child's movements in space result in the beginning 
mental representation of his spatial context in which objects do not have in- 
dependent status from the context or from one another. Such static spatial 
maps provide a background for the more salient objects that move, and 
moving objects come to be increasingly discriminated from their contexts and 
from one another. Children might begin to build up the awareness that 
objects can exist independently from their spatial contexts through a process 
of recording the location of very familiar particular objects that move or are 
otherwise involved in actions. Children can be aware of particular objects 
and their habitual locations from a very early age-perhaps before they begin 
to know any language at all-through movements that (1) bring such objects 
into and out of view and (2) serve to emphasize or highlight an object 
in relation to a static background (see, e.g., Bower 1974; and Tronick 1972). 
Specific objects and then objects in general increase in salience in relation to 
their spatial contexts as the child develops the capabilities for acting on 
objects in particular ways. 
With respect to linguistic development, Huttenlocher (1974) reported 
that names of a family pet or animal words such as "dog" were among the 
earliest words that children whose understanding she tested were able to 
recognize. Other words that the children recognized were similarly objects 
that moved or objects that were acted on, such as cookies. Clark (1973a) re- 
viewed the diary literature and described movement (and four-leggedness 
which also involves movement) as among the most common perceptual fea- 
tures that characterize objects that were frequently named by children's early 
words. Nelson (1973) reported that, for many children, the first words 
they say make reference to objects that move. The most frequent words 
in four Czech-speaking children's early vocabularies compiled by Janota 
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(1972) after "Mummy" and "Daddy" were "bow-wow," "beep beep," "car," 
moo moo," and "bye bye" (English glosses given here). 
In the sensorimotor period before grammar emerges, children learn 
about the permanence of objects through their actions on objects and their 
observations of actions on objects-that is, the child learns that objects exist 
by acting in ways that make them disappear and recur (Piaget 1954; Sinclair 
1973). Thus, the notions of existence, nonexistence, and recurrence are action 
dependent in the single-word utterance period (Bloom 1973). The child 
comes to an awareness of such object states through his own actions, his 
observations of the actions of others, and the movements of objects. By the 
time existence, nonexistence, and recurrence are encoded syntactically, they 
represent stative events as well as action events. 
Subsquently, children encode relations between persons and objects, and 
encoding most often precedes or accompanies action by the child to effect 
those relations. Thus, in the present study, encoding relations between ob- 
jects and persons or between objects appeared to depend upon an ongoing 
or intended action by the child or by another at the child's direction. Only 
after a child learned to encode person-object relations with the support of 
relevant action was he able to encode static relations among objects in which 
neither he himself nor his actions were necessarily relevant to the state of af- 
fairs represented in his message. 
The ability to talk and understand depends upon the complexity of the 
linguistic code in interaction with the child's strategies for learning it. The 
variations in sequence of development (Gia and Kathryn learned action, lo- 
cative action, and possession at the same time, whereas Peter and Eric 
learned them sequentially) appeared to be determined by the underlying 
structural systems that the children were learning, as revealed in the two 
different patterns of grammatical regularity that were represented in the 
speech of the different children. 
SEMANTIC-SYNTACTIC STRUCTURE IN CHILD LANGUAGE 
The claim that children are learning grammar does not require that 
children learn the adult system of grammar or that rules of adult grammar 
account for child sentences. The children's semantic-syntactic systems were 
not the same as the adult system, and adult grammar could not have ac- 
counted for such systems or their development in any adequate way. Never- 
theless, the results of this study strongly support the position that children 
are learning grammatical structure when they combine two and three words 
at the end of the second year. 
The data presented here provided evidence for the three levels of struc- 
ture that were defined earlier for child language: with respect to sentences, 
sequence of development, and for child language in general. At the level of 
the sentence, it was possible to identify semantic-syntactic relationships be- 
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tween constituents for .88 of all the multiword utterances in the speech of the 
four children. With few exceptions, word order was consistent within each 
category, and the speech of each child was consistent with one of two al- 
ternative grammatical systems. Second, the longitudinal development of each 
child manifested antecedents and consequences in (1) the sequence in which 
different categories of semantic-syntactic relationship emerged and devel- 
oped apd (2) the shift from pronominal to nominal or nominal to pronominal 
encoding, as the children enlarged their original linguistic systems to include 
both grammatical alternatives. The semantic-syntactic relationships that the 
children learned did not occur or exist in isolation from one another. There 
was coherence in each child's development: learning the later verb cate- 
gories appeared to depend on the structure already learned for encoding 
earlier verb relations, and it was apparently necessary to learn one system of 
reference (either nominal or pronominal) before learning the other. Given 
information about the language of a particular child at a particular time, 
one could predict other aspects of his language at the same time, whether 
pronominal or nominal reference would predominate, and, at a subsequent 
time, which categories would appear, and the nominal-pronominal shift. 
Finally, when the children were compared with one another, there was con- 
sistency among them in the semantics of their sentences, in the sequence of 
development, and in the pronominal-nominal shift. One could observe regu- 
larities among all four children that were consistent with reports from com- 
parable studies (e.g., Brown 1973) and conclude that there is a coherent 
structure in child language. 
In judging the grammaticality of child speech, it is necessary to distin- 
guish between the dynamic process of the child's acquisition of grammar- 
that is, the psychological reality of his developing knowledge of grammatical 
structure-and the linguistic description of that knowledge at any point in 
time. Judgments of grammaticality cannot be obtained from the child and 
necessarily depend upon observations of the regularities in the child's speech 
data. The way in which a linguistic description can represent such regu- 
larities in children's speech is the issue of formalization that is open to debate 
at the present time. In Bloom (1970), linguistic descriptions were presented 
in the form of generative transformational grammars. Since that time, prog- 
ress in the study of linguistics and linguistic theory has been such that there 
is no longer a unified theory of generative grammar and no consensus about 
the kinds of information to be represented by rules of grammar. The tax- 
onomy of linguistic structures that has been presented here is a linguistic 
description of speech data that can represent the child's knowledge and 
changes in the child's knowledge in only a very gross way. There is no way 
of knowing, at the present time, the form in which such knowledge about 
linguistic structure is represented in the child's mental grammar. 
However, it is possible to speak of the emergence of grammar in the 
child's knowledge when such knowledge is manifested in the child's behav- 
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ior-as he uses multiword utterances with regular and recurring relationship 
between constituents. That is, if structural features occur often enough and 
are shared by a large enough number of different multiword utterances, then 
it is possible to attribute the recurrence of such regular features to the pro- 
ductivity of an underlying rule system (see, e.g., Brown 1973), and attempt 
a linguistic description of what the child's system might consist. What 
such features would be might very well be different for different children 
speaking the same language (as in the present study), and they most cer- 
tainly would be different for children speaking different languages. 
VARIATION IN CHILD LANGUAGE 
The two different systems of semantic-syntactic structure when MLU 
was less than 2.0 morphemes could be compared with the traditional classi- 
fication of language systems as synthetic-agglutinative or analytic-isolating. 
The system of pronominal reference that Peter and Eric learned for their 
early sentences could be described as "agglutinative," with a small number 
of constant morphemes (pronominal "it," "there," "my," etc.) added on to 
other morphemes to signal certain semantic distinctions (affected-object, lo- 
cation, possessor, etc.). In contrast, Gia and Kathryn learned a system 
whereby many different morphemes were combined with one another to 
signal the same semantic distinctions, and such morphemes were more iso- 
latable and less dependent on one another. It is possible to conclude that the 
capacities for both pronominal and nominal encoding (or, put another way, for both agglutinative and isolating linguistic processes) exist among chil- 
dren, from the beginning of the use of syntax. 
Other studies of child language may be interpreted as confirming the 
intersubject nominal-pronominal variation observed among the four children 
in this study. A fifth child, Allison, whose development was reported in 
Bloom (1973, pp. 233-257), used exclusively nominal forms in her early 
syntax, as can be seen in the data presented there. In other data from 
English-speaking children, reported by Huxley (1970) and Nelson (1973), 
there were children who appeared to use predominantly pronominal forms 
and other children who used nominal forms in their earliest syntactic utter- 
ances. In two unpublished studies by Lightbown (1973) and Vosniadou 
(1974), the speech of French- and Greek-speaking children was described, 
respectively, and the almost exclusive occurrence of either nominal or pro- 
nominal forms was observed in the early syntactic utterances of the different 
children. It appears that an individual child's first sentences are either nomi- 
nal or pronominal, and the two systems of reference are not mutually substi- 
tutable in the beginning. 
The variation among the children in the pronominal and nominal en- 
coding of verb relations and possession can be attributed to the two strate- 
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gies for syntactic encoding described in Bloom (1973). The first strategy 
is the linear combination of one word, having the same form and same 
meaning, with various other words, for example, "fix it," "eat it," "read it," 
etc., where "it" operates much like a formal marker. The second strategy 
is the hierarchical combination of categories of words, with a structural 
meaning that is essentially independent of the lexical meaning of each word 
separately. It seems that children can break into the adult linguistic code in 
one of (at least) two ways: with a system of formal markers, or with a system 
of rules for deriving grammatical categories. Both strategies would provide 
the child with a means for representing the same semantic information in 
his speech, with greater or lesser lexical specification, and both are aspects of 
the adult code. The choice of strategy (if there is a choice) as children begin 
to use syntax would appear to be the result of complex interactions between 
cognitive development and linguistic experience. Once a child has recog- 
nized the relations among objects and events that recur with different objects 
in different situations, he can begin to learn a system of syntactic coding that 
represents such information about events, in the speech that he hears and 
in his own speech. The aspects of the system that he learns will be deter- 
mined at least in part by the kind of linguistic reference that he hears. 
Parents may differ from one another in the relative extent to which 
they use pronominal or nominal forms in their speech to their children. 
Nominal forms may well predominate generally in speech to children for in- 
creased specificity or redundancy, for the sake of gaining attention, adding 
emphasis, or increasing clarity. The interaction in the present study was 
between investigator and child primarily, but in the mother-to-child speech 
that was recorded the four mothers did not differ from one another in the 
extent of pronominal reference. 
The use of proforms in adult-to-adult speech is governed by a fairly 
explicit system of deictic reference (see, e.g., Fillmore 1971). Adults use 
proforms according to the information that speaker and listener share about 
events. If an object has already been named or otherwise pointed out in the 
situation, then the use of pronoun reference occurs with no loss of infor- 
mation because both speaker and listener know, for example, the particular 
object to which "it" refers, or the place to which "there" refers. Adults use 
proforms gesturally, when they also point out or otherwise indicate the 
object, action, or person of reference, and anaphorically, when the object, 
action, or person of reference has already been named by either speaker or 
listener in the situation. Whether one says "eat the spinach" or "eat it," or 
whether one says "the book is on the table" or "it's over there" depends 
upon what both the speaker and the hearer already know about the situa- 
tion and about one another. 
Children are exposed to systems of deictic reference, with shifting be- tween nominal and pronominal forms, in both the adult-to-child speech that 
they hear and the adult-to-adult speech that they overhear. This intraspeaker 
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variation that forms a part of adult competence and interacts with infor- 
mation about situational and interpersonal contingencies can be compared 
with the interspeaker variation among the children in their early use of pro- 
nominal or nominal reference. However, the use of proforms and substantive 
forms in the children's speech was not a system of shifting deictic reference; 
the children used either one or the other form of reference. The use of pro- 
forms by Peter and Eric was neither gesturally nor anaphorically condi- 
tioned, and when the pronominal-nominal shift for each of the children oc- 
curred it was not conditioned by such deictic constraints from the situation 
or awareness of the information shared with a listener. 
Other kinds of evidence indicate that children who are less than 3 
years old would not know such communication conventions for speaking and 
understanding that take into account the information that is shared between 
speaker and listener and that contributes to determining message form (e.g., 
Brown 1973; Flavell 1968; Glucksberg, Krauss, & Higgins 1975; Maratsos 
1971). It appears then that children learn usage constraints on nominal and 
pronominal encoding after they acquire the formal linguistic means for shift- 
ing reference, which the children in this study began to acquire when MLU 
was approximately 2.5 morphemes and they were approximately 2 years old. 
How they proceeded to learn to take account of social, cognitive, and linguis- 
tic variables as the factors for shifting pronominal or nominal encoding, 
in their later development, remains to be determined. 
Strategies for Language Acquisition 
The children's early development of syntax can be attributed to two 
alternative strategies. For Peter and Eric, the early development of syntax 
can be attributed to a pronominal strategy because early sentences used pro- 
nominal forms that functioned to represent a variety of objects or persons 
in event relationships. In contrast, for Gia and Kathryn, the early develop- 
ment of syntax can be attributed to a categorization strategy, because their 
use of sentences was characterized by the use of categories of nominal forms 
with particular grammatical functions. 
Different investigators have attempted to explain variability in child 
language behavior in terms of children's strategies for language acquisition.8 
In one context, Bever (1970), Clark (1973b), and Slobin (1971), among 
others, have proposed successive strategies of acquisition to explain varia- 
bility or change in linguistic behavior as a function of development. They 
each proposed sequences of strategies that children use in the process of 
learning how to obtain meaning from the words and structure of adult sen- 
tences. The strategies proposed by Bever were hierarchically ordered accord- 
8 See, also, Bowerman (1974) for discussion of strategies for language ac- 
quisition. 
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ing to the relative complexity or the syntactic constraints of English sen- 
tences. The strategies proposed by Slobin and Clark consisted of processing 
directives that retrospectively accounted for several of the findings in studies 
of child language and development. Such successive strategies are the steps 
or rules that children follow for proceeding from one level of development 
to another, and such strategies, in effect, represent stages in development. 
The context in which strategies have been proposed in the present study 
is the variation observed among different children at the same level of de- 
velopment. Rather than hierarchical, according to complexity of the adult- 
model language, or sequential, to account for developmental change (as were 
the successive strategies proposed by Bever [1970], Clark [1973b], and Slo- 
bin [1971]), the two strategies offered here are attempts to explain the two 
different approaches taken by different children in the course of develop- 
ment. While both strategies have to do with learning aspects of the model 
language, one or the other predominated in the development of different 
children in the same period of time. The use of strategies in this second con- 
text is meant to imply an organizational scheme, for representing information 
and taking in new information, based upon the inferences the child has made 
about the linguistic system. His use of this organization of linguistic infor- 
mation represents his map, or plan-that is, his strategy for linguistic behav- 
ior and language learning. Sequential strategies for developmental change 
would operate within the more general organizational strategy such as the 
pronominal strategy or the categorization strategy proposed in the present 
study, and one could propose, for example, a set of operating instructions 
for shifting from nominal to pronominal or from pronominal to nominal 
representation. 
Substantive intersubject variation has also been described in phono- 
logical development by Ferguson. In Ferguson, Peizer, and Weeks (1973), 
two organizational strategies were described as accounting for different rules 
used by different children in their early phonological acquisition: one, the 
choice of consonant-vowel-consonant-vowel models with "assimilation to full 
reduplication" (p. 61), and an alternative strategy of reducing polysyllabic items to monosyllables. Ferguson (personal communication) has described 
two different organizational strategies for the acquisition of Spanish liquids: 
one strategy was first represented by "some kind of lateral" for 1, r, rr, and 
intervocalic d (E5), while the other strategy had "r-quality sounds fairly early." It appears then that in phonological development as in grammatical devel- 
opment, different children can travel different paths to the same end. 
There well may be important variation in the duration of different 
children's use of either an initial pronominal or nominal strategy for en- 
coding grammatical relations. In the present study, the four children pro- 
gressed from their earliest productive syntax (when MLU was approximately 
1.3) to the pronominal-nominal or nominal-pronominal shift (when MLU 
was approximately 2.5) in a period of from 12 to 20 weeks. A child might 
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possibly stay with one or another strategy for only a few weeks (or less) 
or for a much longer period of time. Indeed, it well may be the case that 
the strategy shift presents problems for some children, and they may make 
the shift with difficulty if they make it at all. In a study by Morehead and 
Ingram (1973), the speech of children whose language was diagnosed as 
disordered appeared to be quite limited in lexical representation, so that one 
could conceivably explain their language disorder as an inability to shift from 




In the present analysis, the regularities and consistencies in the data 
provided evidence of child-language structure that is more like adult gram- 
mar than it is different and, furthermore, contains both the analytic and 
synthetic features of languages in general. The analytic aspects of languages 
such as English were manifest in the early combinations of categories of 
nominal forms in the speech of Gia and Kathryn, while the early use of pro- 
nominal forms by Peter and Eric was interpreted as similar to processes of 
affixing as observed in synthetic languages such as Russian and Finnish. The 
variation observed in the present study helps to explain the apparently con- 
tradictory "pivot grammar" and "telegraphic speech" descriptions of child 
language that were reported in the 1960s. It also helps to explain the fact 
that some investigators in cross-linguistic research (e.g., Burling 1959; Park 
1970; Pavlovitch 1920) have reported exceptions to what has been viewed 
as a universal in child language, namely, that children use content words 
in rigid order before they learn to use synthetic features of language (inflec- 
tions and other functors). McNeill (1970) has suggested that, since some 
languages require rigid word order and few inflections while others use 
variable word order and obligatory inflections, children can be expected to 
be influenced by one or the other of these two approaches in their early 
language learning. (See also Brown [1973] and Traugott [1973] for further 
discussion of this issue.) Further, however, the observed variation can be 
viewed as the genesis of the capacity for shifting pronominal-nominal refer- 
ence that is required before the child can learn systems of usage constraints 
that depend on situational and interpersonal contingencies. 
Until the emergence of the capacity for alternative pronominal and 
nominal reference, it was possible to conclude that form followed function 
in the children's language development. When the children first began to use 
grammar, it was clear that what they were learning to talk about was deter- 
mined by what they knew about objects and events in the world. Interpre- 
tation of their utterances was straightforward because the mapping relation 
between underlying semantic intent and surface form was quite direct. How- 
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ever, the capacity for alternative pronominal and nominal reference provided 
the first evidence of function following form in language development. The 
children had learned that they could refer in sentences to a car as "it" and 
"car," they could refer to a place as "there" and "floor," and they could 
refer to possessions as "Kathryn ('s)" and "my." However, they had not begun 
to learn the social and linguistic conventions that govern the use of one 
or another kind of reference for communication. 
The developmental distinctions between action and state events in gen- 
eral, and locative-action and locative-state events in particular, correspond 
to the grammatical distinctions of "dynamic" and "static" aspectual oppo- 
sition, of which the opposition "directional" (locative action) versus "loca- 
tive" (locative state) is a particular manifestation (see Leech 1970, pp. 198- 
201; and Lyons 1968, pp. 298, 397). Traugott (in press) has discussed the 
dynamic-static opposition for locative terms in pidgin and creole languages 
and concluded that the dynamic aspect appears to dominate in the evolution 
of such languages. The sequence of linguistic development reported here may 
be a reflection of the more basic dynamic-static distinction in languages 
in general. 
The conclusions offered here are necessarily tentative, awaiting confir- 
mation from studies of more children. The patterns of regularity and varia- 
tion that have been described here emerged from the data as the result of 
quantitative comparisons. Just as anecdotal evidence or the description of 
isolated behaviors is never adequate for justifying an assumption about un- 
derlying knowledge, it is also true that the conclusions presented here were 
based upon performance values that were relative. Indeed, it seems safe 
to say that there are no absolutes in child language. However, when large 
interactions in the linguistic data occur they can be interpreted as impor- 
tant evidence of regularities and patterns of developmental variation in the 
language of a particular child and, eventually, in the language of larger 
numbers of children. Other, smaller effects are no doubt a function of other 
variable factors which will also need to be spelled out eventually. 
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The Appendix consists of utterances from each speech sample, from 
each child, that are examples of the semantic-syntactic categories. Only 
productive categories are illustrated. The utterances were selected for presen- 
tation here in the following way: two utterances were chosen as examples 
for every five utterance types in each category, up to a maximum of 10 exam- 
ples from any one category, regardless of how many utterance types actually 
were in the category. The examples were taken from the transcript in the 
order they occurred, with the following limitations: (1) If several utterances 
in the same category occurred in one speech event, then only one of them 
was chosen. For example, if the child had finished drinking milk and 
was asking for more, and said, "I want milk Mommy/want milk/want more 
milk/" only the first of these child utterances was included here as an 
example. (2) Utterances which represented more than one semantic-syntac- 
tic category, such as "I read my book" (Action and Possession), are pre- 
sented here as examples for only one category. 
Different verb tenses are used in describing the situation and context: 
progressive for simultaneous action, simple present for actions or events which 
precede or follow an utterance, utterances are spaced on lines before or after 
the description according to whether they are preceded or followed by the 
action. An arrow at the end of an utterance indicates rising intonation; 
a slash indicates utterance boundary. 




Eric I (not productive) 
Eric II: 
(Eric picks up his pail) 
(Eric picks up his drum) 
Eric III: 
(Eric reaching for cup of juice) 
(Eric looking for block; Lois is holding it) 
Eric and Lois have been looking for driver of toy 
truck; Eric gets up and goes to look for it in vacuum 
cleaner) 
(Eric assembles tank car) 
(Eric assembling train) 
(Eric going under bed after a bead) 
(Eric throws disk) 
(Eric retrieves disk; giving it to Lois) 
Eric IV: 
(Eric takes ball from his stroller and gives it to Lois) 
(Eric breaking cereal) 
(Eric picks up piece of slide that Lois brought) 
(Lois rolls disk; Eric going after it) 
(Eric closes tape recorder; turns to light which is off) 
(Eric looking on floor for blocks) 
(then Eric kicks slide over) 
(Eric starting to put slide together) 
(Eric stacking blocks) 
(Eric nesting blocks) 
Eric V: 
(Eric pushing his cup of cocoa away) 
Mommy: What did you drink with a straw? 
(Eric runs from bathroom to living room where 
Lois is sitting) 
(Eric telling Lois about trip to fire house with Daddy) 
(Mommy had spanked Eric's hand) 
(Eric pointing to tape recorder) 
(Eric giving Lois a disk to roll down slide) 
(Lois hadn't brought choo-choo train) 
(Eric moving Lois's hands so she'll put two pieces of 
toy slide together) 
(Lois had just closed lid of tape recorder; Eric trying 
to open it) 
a find it 
play it 
a eat juice 
a find it 
ha look for it 
I fix it 
a fix it 
a got it 
I do 
I find it 
I'll give you a ball 
a broke it 
a bring slides 
I got at blue 
turn light off 
a look for at 
a break itl 
a break it] 
a fix it 
I do it 
a make house 
I finish 
I drink a cocoa 
I do pipi 
a fire engine make noise 
sometimes you hit 
you turn that 4 
take one 
a bring a choo-choo train 
tomorrow 4 
a put it 
open it 
Action and Place 
Eric I-IV (not productive) . 
Eric V: 
(Eric and Lois looking out window at man walking) walking street 
(Eric's baby sister had just had a bath; Mommy lifts 
her out) a baby swim bath t 
(Eric catches his finger in nesting blocks as he stacks 
them) my finger got stuck in there 
Attribution 





(Eric taking truck from toy bag) 
(Eric points to lamp which is off) 
Eric IV: 
(Eric talking about the last time he went to the 
beach) 
(Eric looks at picture of two buffalo on cereal box) 
Mommy: How many buffalo are there? 
(Eric holding sheep) 
(Eric picks up green disk) 
(Eric watching tape-recorder reels) 
(Eric pointing to tape recorder control buttons) 
(Eric gives Lois two disks) 
(Eric holding yellow disk) 
(Eric pointing to shelf with bear and duck on it) 
(Eric and Lois in living room, hear noise of vacuum 
cleaner in Eric's room) 
Eric V: 
Mommy: Sometimes I hit you when you're a bad boy. 
(Lois points to missing part of clown's hat) 
(Eric picks up yellow disk and brings it to Lois) 
(Eric puts green and yellow disks on bed) 
(Eric looking out window at people walking) 
(Eric picks up clown; 
picking up second clown) 
(Mommy asks Eric how many hands his baby sister 
has) 
(Eric looking out window at police car) 
(Mommy asks Eric what color tootsie lollipop he 
wants) 
(Eric trying to stand man on block) 
red car 
light hot 
e pool cold 
three buffalo 
little that 
green one/a big one 
two wheels 
a wheel button 
two wheel 
that's yellow one 
funny duck 
other room 
da bad boy/a naught/you a 
naughty boy ' / 
e broken clown 
here's a yellow one 
that green/that yellow 





a green one tootsie lop 
man a good boy 
Dative 
Eric I-III (not productive) 
Eric IV: 
(Eric points to car out of window) 
I,ois: What's green? Where? (Eric pointing out 
window) 
(Eric hears vacuum cleaner noise; runs to door) 
(Mommy asks Eric where Iris is) 
(then Eric runs into hallway and points toward 
parents' bedroom) 
(Lois is putting her toys away; Eric has train car) 
Eric V: 
(Mommy is giving Eric's baby sister a bath; Eric 
watching) Mommy: When does Eric get a bath? 
(Eric had put lambs into stacked blocks; called them 
houses; he knocks blocks down; starting to stack 
them again) 
(Lois arrives at front door: Eric runs to open it) 
(Eric and Lois reading Anybody Home; Eric turns to 
picture of snail) 
(Iois gives Eric a puppet; Eric puts it in box) 
(Eric tries to trade books with Lois, but she doesn't 
want to) Lois: This is the book I want to read. 
(Eric taking Lois's book) 
a green/green/ 
I'll show you 
show me 
show you 
show Mommy that 
Daddy give Eric bath 
I make the nother house lambs 
open door Mrs. Bloom 
tell me what's at 
a give it to you 
OK/a back to you/ 




Eric I (not productive) 
Eric II: 
(Eric turns to opened toy box) 
(Eric points to doll) 
Eric III: 
(Eric fitting lamb piece in puzzle) 
(Eric picking up clown) 
(Eric takes rattle and whistle from toy box) 
(Eric picking up bird) 
(Eric climbs on chair and reaches toward lamp) 
(Eric pointing to bunny) 
Eric IV: 
(Eric holding hair brush) 
(Eric points to telephone on wall) 
(Eric pointing to train) 
(Eric pointing to tape-recorder buttons) 
(Eric points to vacuum cleaner) 
(Eric pointing to dump car) 
(Eric picks up book; looking at picture of birds) 
(Lois opens closet door; vacuum cleaner is inside) 
(Eric pulls out Daddy form) 
(Eric pointing to tape recorder) 
Eric V: 
(Eric brings yellow disk to Lois) 
(Eric picks up clown; shaking it) 
(Eric showing Mommy lamb and block) 
(Eric pointing to truck) 
(Lois and Eric looking at animal book; book is opened 
to picture of horse ) 
(Mommy gives Eric his pacifier) 
(Eric taking train from toy bag) 
(Eric showing Mommy tank car) 
(Eric pointing to last coupling on train) 











that choo-choo train 
a button 
a cleaner 
e dump car 




here's a yellow 
a clown 
lamb/an that's a toy 
that fire engine 
a horsie 
this pacifier 
this a choo-choo train 
this is a tank 
this a end 
no/this a engine 
Intention 
Eric I-IV (not productive) 
Eric V: 
(Eric had been reading Mrs. Tittlemouse with 
Mommy, Lois, and two children; the children are 
preparing to leave) a want see Tittlemouse 
(Eric climbing on Mommy's chair) a want sit there 
(Eric walks over to his toy chest; the tape recorder is 
on the toy chest) a wanta sit down 
(Lois makes man of clay; head falls off; Lois puts it 
back on) want look a man 
(Mommy is giving Eric's baby sister a bath) Mommy: 
Let's give baby Nancy a shampoo shall we? (Eric 
reaching for shampoo bottle) a want hold it 
(Eric trying to reach his baby sister in her crib) I want kiss it/I want kiss 
Locative Action 
Eric I-II (not productive) . 
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Locative Action (Continued) 
Eric III: 
(Eric putting man on blocks) 
(Eric getting up) 
Eric IV: 
(Eric putting toys away in toy bag) 
(Eric putting clown on top of blocks) 
(Eric fitting disk into block) 
(Eric fitting disk in hole) 
(tower of blocks crashes down) 
(Eric positioning large block; 
but doesn't sit on it) 
(Eric pushing toy train) 
(part of train falls over) 
(Eric putting man on train) 
(Eric putting plane piece into puzzle; he had called it 
a wrench instead of a plane) 
Eric V: 
(then Eric and Lois go into bathroom) 
(Eric pointing to toy man; 
then Eric puts man in car 
(Eric puts bendable figure in block) 
(Eric carrying (lisks to his bed) 
(Eric looking out window; shouting to man who has 
walked away) 
(Eric looks out window at bird; bird walks out of 
sight) 
(Eric trying to balance toy car on top of block pile) 
(Mommy preparing to leave house) 
(Eric holding up piece of toy engine) 
(Eric had stood toy man on blocks; man falls off) 
man sit blocks 
I get down 
all away 
another clown up here 
a fits here 
nother fit 
it fall down 
I'll sit here 
train a bye bye 
choo-choo fall down/choo-choo 
train fall 
a man sit train 
wrench go there 
we go a toilet 
that goes there 
a put it 
I put it down 
you come here 
birdie away 
I took car on this 
you go out little bit 
a piece go 
man fall off 
Locative State 
Eric I-III (not productive) 
Eric IV: 
(Eric hears noise of people in the street) 
(Eric reaches toward lamp which is off) 
Lois: No more light? Where is the light? 
(Eric points to toys on shelf) 
(Eric drinks juice) 
(Eric pointing to spindle of tape-recorder reels) 
(Eric looks at wheels on train; then picks up car; 
pointing to wheels on car) 
(Eric pointing to Daddy figure in dump car) 
Eric V: 
(Eric pointing to pigeon walking on street) 
(Mommy is sitting on stool) 
(Toy man had fallen off train a few minutes before; 
Eric pointing to it) 
(Eric looking into crib) 
(Eric picks up Animals, a book) 
(Eric looking at car parked on the street) 
(Eric had climbed on chair; after minute's pause) 
(Eric looking out window at several pigeons) 
(Eric pointing to book on shelf of his chest) 
(Eric asks where toy man is; looks for it; finding it) 
people an street 
no more light 
a light up here 
a dolly up here 
any soda in there ' 
pin in it 
wheels car too 
Daddy up here 
there's a birdie in there 
Mommy sit 
man sit 
a baby there 1 
bumblebee in there 
a car going there 
I sitting Mommy 
a pigeon there 
this up in air 




Eric I-II (not productive) 
Eric III: 
(Eric rolls beads; looking for more; can't find any) 
(Eric brings disks to Lois; looking around but no 
disks are left) 
(Eric trying to nest blocks) 
(Eric twists wheels on axle; stopping it) 
(Eric putting toy car in bag) 
(Eric heard an airplane outside a few minutes pre- 
vious) 
Eric IV: 
(Eric eats last piece of cereal) 
(Eric trying to fit disk in very small hole) 
(Eric pointing to space for fourth train car) 
(Eric pushes switch to turn lamp on, but it doesn't go 
on) 
(Eric pressing on-off button of vacuum cleaner) 
(vacuum cleaner stops) 
(Eric finishes putting all pieces on form board) 
(Eric pointing to empty space on form board) 
(noise from vacuum cleaner stops; Lois tells Eric that 
Iris turned it off) 
Eric V: 
(Eric had been looking out window at pigeon; it flew 
away) 
(Lois and Eric had been putting lambs in blocks; Eric 
pointing to empty block) 
Lois: We could put this black one in there, Eric. 
(Eric taking block away) 
(water from hose drips into a bucket; stops) 
(Eric knocks over blocks with lambs in them; lambs 
fall out) 
(Eric holds parts of slide out to Lois) 
Lois: Can you put that on? (Eric holding it out to 
Lois) 
(Eric pushes car under bridge and bridge collapses) 
(Mommy tries to put bib on Eric; he squirms away) 
(Eric had been on a roller coaster recently) Mommy: 
Would you like to go again on the roller coaster? 
(Eric tries to sit on pile of stacked blocks that is too 
high for him) 
(Eric tries to fit one block into another; can't do it) 
no more 
no one 
no go in 
no more noise 
no more car 
no more airplane 
a no more 
it doesn't fit 
missing there 
no more light 
no more cleaner 
no more chine 
no more pieces 
missing here 
a no more cleaner/off 
no more birdie 
a missing there- 
no in there 
no more water 
no more lamb 
you put a on 
I can't/you put a on 
no more bridge 
no bib 
no I didn't go back roller coaster 
and a no sit down 
doesn't fit 
Notice 
Eric I-III (not productive) 
Eric IV: 
(Eric sees piece of tinker toy) I see/I see train 
(Eric and Lois are looking out window) I see another man 
Eric V: 
(Eric points to yellow disk) I see yellow (a disc rolled under chest; Eric pointing to chest) see under there f 
(Eric pointing to disks he had put on bed) see wheel ? (Lois opened tape recorder; Eric watching reels) see chines , (Eric pointing to man out window) look a man 




Eric V (Continued): 
(referring to picture in book) I see monkeys there 
(Eric pointing to disc on floor near crib) look a wheels 
(Lois opens refrigerator; there is juice inside) see juice 
Place 
Eric I-III (not productive) 
Eric IV: 
(Eric pointing to his dresser) a up there 
(Eric pointing to top of closet) up there 
(Eric pointing into block) right here 
(Eric picking up disks; a this/up here/over here 
then fits a disk into a block) 
Eric V: 
(Eric pointing out window to man walking on the 
street) way up there 
(Eric telling Lois about his ride on a roller coaster) the roller coaster nice/ 
Lois: Was the roller coaster nice? 
yes/up in the air 
(Lois asked Eric if he'd like to go on the roller coaster 
again; Eric said no; Mommy repeats question) 
Mommy: Would you like to? 
no on the train 
(Eric trying to make bendable figure sit on train) a in dump car 
(Eric had been pushing vehicles under bridge; bridge 
collapses; Lois sets bridge up again) under bridge/again/under bridge 
(Eric puts bear on pillow) Lois: What did you do? 
on pillow 
(Lois presses piece of clay on Eric's nose; Eric holding 
his knee up) on a knee 
(Eric lines pieces of clay along crossbar of crib; going 
to get more clay) on a bed 
Possession 
Eric I-IV (not productive) 
Eric V: 
(Lois and Eric eating lollipops) this a mine lollipop 
(Eric sees bottle of his baby sister's shampoo; baby shampoo 
then picks it up) 
(Eric and Lois are looking out the window; a car 
similar to Eric's family car stops outside) and this a my car 
(Eric sees a man walking on the street who looks like 
a man he knows, Jimmy) his name a Jimmy 
(Lois pushes toy truck back and forth) gimme 
Lois: What? What do you want? 
my truck 
(Lois reaches for clay Eric has been playing with) it's mine clay 
Recurrence 
Eric I-II (not productive) 
Eric III: 
(Eric twists wheels; stops; no more noise/ 
twisting wheels again) more noise 
(Eric slides disk; sliding another one) nother one 
Eric IV: 
(Eric eats piece of pineapple; Mommy gives him 
another piece; Eric eating it) another one 
(Eric breaks pieces of cereal; picking up broken 




Eric IV (Continued): 
(Eric and Mommy are looking out window; many 
people are walking by in the street) 
Mommy: Yes? What else do you see? 
(Eric nests one block into another; nesting another 
one) 
(Eric taking second clown from toy bag) 
(Lois has book; Eric picking up other book) 
(Eric rolls disk down slide: 
picks disk up; but doesn't roll it) 
(Eric picks up dump car; pointing to engine) 
(Eric turns button on tape-recorder handle; turning 
button on other side of handle) 
Eric V: 
(Eric putting second figure on block) 
(Eric looking out window at people walking) 
(Eric pointing to lamb; 
pointing to second lamb) 
(Eric pushes bridge down; laughs) Lois: What 
happened to the bridge? 
(Lois had made a man out of clay) Lois: Shall we put 
the clay away? 
(Lois and Eric are looking out the window; there are 
two trees) 
(Eric and Lois each have a clump of clay; Eric reach- 
ing for Lois's clay) 
(Lois puts piece of clay on Eric's knee; Eric hands 
Lois another piece) 
(Lois had put cat finger puppet on Eric's finger; it 
falls off) 








another ready go 
this a dump car too 
another turn button too 
another one 
oh another man 
that's a lamb/ 
that's a lamb/nother lamb 
a more bridge/more bridge/ 
more bridge please 
no clay/make another man 
I see tree/I see another tree 
more clays 




Eric I-II (not productive) 
Eric III: 
(Eric eats apple; finishes it, whining) 
(Lois teases Eric that she's going to take his book 
home) 
(Eric and Mommy are looking for Eric's shoes) 
(Eric taking slide from Lois) 
Eric IV: 
(Eric holding lamb) 
(Eric pointing to disks Lois is holding) 
(Eric tries to take book from Lois; whines) 
(Eric looks at picture of raccoon holding an apple; 
closing book) 
(Eric pointing to photograph of himself sleeping) 
(Eric puts Mommy form flat on board) 
(Eric goes to closet where vacuum cleaner is) 
(Eric looks for train; can't find it) 
Eric V: 
(Eric's baby sister is crying) 
want more apple 
a need book 
a need shoes 
I need that 
a got it/I got it 
need that 
I want book 
a want apple too 
baby sleep 
Mommy sleeping 
a want cleaner 
a want choo-choo train 




Eric V (Continued): 
(Eric standing in front of chest under which disks had 
rolled) I need that blue 
(Eric takes block from Lois) I need that 
(Eric stands man on block; it falls and is flat on floor) man rest 
(Eric holds empty dish out to Lois) want some nuts 
(Eric sees toy fire engine behind him) I need a fire engine 
(Eric is about to eat lunch) I want bagel 
(Mommy opening container of cream cheese for Eric's 
lunch) I like the cole slaw 
(Eric has been crying; Mommy goes to get pacifier) a want a pacifier 
(Eric and Lois had been playing with the train; Eric 
now playing with dump car) a like a choo-choo train 
Wh-Question 
Eric I-IV (not productive) 
Eric V: 
(Eric looking in toy bag) 
(Lois slides red disk; Eric retrieves it; looking around) 
(Lois knocks over blocks) 
(Eric pointing to Lois's toy bag) 
(Iois dumps puzzle out; Eric points to empty puzzle 
board) 
(Eric holding out piece of puzzle to Lois) 
(Eric holding up engine piece of puzzle) 
(Eric takes out toy car that has space for driver) 
(Eric pointing to end of train made up of adjoining 
cars) 
(Eric and Lois are reading Anybody Home; book was 
opened to picture of bumblebee, but Eric loses the 
page) 
where's it/where's a/ 
where's a choo-choo train/ 
where's a yellow 
why you want a do that 
where a choo-choo train in there 
where's a goes there 
what this 
what engine go 
where's a man 
a what's there 




Gia I (not productive) 
Gia II: 
(Gia points to lamp which is off) 
(Gia and Lois looking at snapshots) Lois: What's 
Mommy doing? (picture of Mommy on carousel) 
(Gia looking at picture of herself on small animal) 
Lois: Who's riding? 
(Gia pushes snapshots away; picking up Pat the 
Bunny) 
(Gia opens book to picture of girl pushing carriage) 
(Gia riding tike bike) 
(Gia breaks off piece of cookie; putting it in her 
mouth) 
(Gia carrying book to Mommy) 
Gia III: 
(Gia taking Anybody Home from toy bag; then hands 
it to Lois) 
(Gia taking slide from toy bag; then gives it to Lois) 
(Gia putting disk on slide; rolls disk) 
(Gia trying to put man in truck) 
(Lois stacks blocks; Gia knocks them down, laughs; 
starts to stack them again) 
(Gia pulls her tricycle into center of room; then gets 
on it) 
(Gia and Lois go into dark bedroom; Gia looking for 
lamp) 
(Gia trying to snap form board cover closed) 
(Gia sitting on tank car) 
(Gia holding book out to Mommy) 
Gia IV: 
(Gia tries to put slide together; can't; giving it to 
Lois) 
(Gia and Lois go into bedroom; Mommy is taking 
sheets off bed) 
(Gia scribbles on paper; it tears) 
(Gia plays with slide; Mommy comes into room; Gia 
going to Mommy) 
(Gia scribbling on paper) 
(Gia pushes cart) 
(Gia having trouble nesting blocks) 
(Lois builds "house" of blocks; Gia knocks it down; 
starts to build it up) 
(Gia reaching for tape-recorder button; Lois stops 
her) 
(Gia pushes truck into bridge; bridge falls; Gia trying 
to build bridge again) 
Gia V: 
(Gia runs into living room with musical T.V. that her 
uncle had brought for her) 
(Gia takes book from toy bag and giving it to Lois; 
Gia taking another book from bag) 
(Gia points to piece of scotch tape on book) Mommy: 
What happened to the book? 
(Mommy is ready to leave; Gia running to door; 
opens door) 
turned on light 
ride Dumbo 
ride da fish 
more/see book 
ka push a carriage 
ride dis 
eat piece 
read a book 
a read dat book 
fix dat ' 
Gia do it 
ride truck 
Gia more 
Gia ride bike 
on light 
a close button 
Gia ride tank car 
Mommy open that 
Lois fix it 
Mommy change sheets 
tear it 





push a button 
bridge/build a bridge 
Uncle Paul a record 
you read this book/ 
I read this book 
a tore it 




Gia V (Continued): 
(Gia putting man in car) man a ride this truck 
(Gia opens up book which she and Lois use as a tunnel; 
puts opened book on end) I make a tunnel 
(Gia tries to connect two train cars; can't) Lois help Gia ? 
(Gia and Lois push train; it buckles and comes apart) bump my train 
(Gia going toward Animal book; picking up bendable 
man on the way) read a book/a man a read a booki 
(Gia running to bedroom; pulls her bike out and gets I ride my bike 
on it) 
Action and Place 
Gia I (not productive) 
Gia II: 
(Gia scribbling on paper) write a paper 
(Gia trying to scribble on picture of rabbit in book) write a rabbit 
Gia III (not productive) 
Gia IV: 
(Gia scribbling on paper) draw paper 
(Gia going to desk; write a paper Mommy 
Gia reaches for paper; Mommy gives it to her) 
(Gia holding out her finger which has pen marks on it) Gia write finger 
(Gia climbs on orange chair holding book in her hand) read orange chair 
Gia V: 
Lois: Shall we sit on the sofa and read my book? 
(Gia going to orange chair) orange chair a read a book 
(Lois attaches paper to clipboard and puts it on table; I'm draw clipboard 
Gia draws) 
(Gia has tried on new jacket; Mommy starts to 
unbutton it; Gia pulls away) I wanta wear outside 
(Gia hears children shouting in hall) I want play a Kevin hall 
(Gia scribbles on toy pan) I write my pan 
(Gia writes on her stomach) I'm a write belly 
Attribution 
Gia I (not productive) 
Gia II: 
(Gia looking at picture of hen and chicks) Lois: Who's 
that? (hen) 
Mommy chicken 
(Gia pointing to record player on which she plays 
children's records) baby record 
Gia III: 
(Gia pointing to picture of chick) baby chicken 
(Gia picking up Daddy's magazine) Daddy new book (Gia looking at picture of a bad baby) bad bad boy baby 
(Gia looking at picture of boy running after bus) little boy school bus 
(Gia puts form board cover on her head) Mommy: 
What a pretty hat. 
new hat 
(Gia and Lois are reading; Gia struggles to get up) 
Lois: What do you want? bunny rabbit book 
(Gia picks up Animals, which has rabbit on the 
cover) 
Gia IV: 
(Gia comes out of kitchen with box of birthday 





Gia IV (Continued): 
(Lois pointing to picture of baby elephant) 
(Gia carrying empty wine bottle to desk) 
(Gia points to her blankets at bottom of laundry cart) 
(Gia giving smallest nesting block to Lois) 
(Gia fitting boy figure on form board) 
(Gia pointing to baby in picture of a family) 
(Gia holds book; Lois holds another) Lois: Which 
one (shall we read)? (Gia hitting one Lois has) 
(Gia picks up Toys after looking through magazines) 
(Gia trying to snap tape-recorder cover closed) 
Lois: That's right. You never pushed that one before. 
Gia V: 
(Lois is sitting on orange chair ready to read book to 
Gia; Gia pointing to tape recorder) 
(Gia reassembles book "bridge") 
(Gia putting red disk on slide) 
Lois: (referring to disk) See if the green one's in the 
block. Look in the block. (Gia going to mirror block) 
(Gia painting with black paint) 
(Gia putting brush in blue paint) 
(Gia painting on big piece of paper on wall) 
(Gia wipes her hands with washcloth; putting cloth 
back) 
(Gia pointing to small ball in picture; 
pointing to big one) 




one two blanket 




this a nice book 
push a new button 
take dis orange chair 
I make a new bridge 
a red one 
dis block 
I draw red man/I draw black man 
this a blue one 
that too big 
it's nice and clean 
there's a little ball/ 
there's a big ball 
you draw big pencil/I'm draw 
little pencil 
Dative 
Gia I-IV (not productive) 
Gia V: 
(Gia is pretending that she's going to Jeffrey's house; 
taking book from toy bag) bring Jeffrey book 
(Gia "feeds" lamb) lamb a cookie 
Existence 
Gia I: 
(Lois holding up button) a button 
(Gia looking at picture of teddy bear) a baby 
(Gia holding out box of tape-recorder tape) a box 
(Gia pointing to picture of rabbit) a rabbit 
Gia II: 
(Gia pointing to phonograph cabinet) a record 
(Gia looking at picture of dog) da bow wow 
(Gia opening book to picture of children playing 
peekaboo) a peekboo 
(Gia holding lamb) Lois: What's that? 
a lamb 
(Gia pointing to rabbit in book) a rabbit 
(Gia reaching for coin bank) da bank 
(Gia pointing to her new stroller) Lois: Oh what's 
that? 
a stroller 
(Gia pointing to records on top of record player) a record 
(Gia pointing to cookies on top of refrigerator) a cookie 





(Gia turning pages of book) 
(Gia points to picture of baby) Lois: Who's that? 
(Gia picking shoe up) 
(Gia pulls seesaw from box) 
(Lois: What's that? 
Gia IV: 
(Gia picking up Lois's keys) 
(Gia and Lois looking at picture of dog in book) Lois: 
What's that? 
(Gia pointing to a record) 
(Gia pointing to picture of a Daddy) 
(Gia looking through magazine; stops at page with a 
map) 
Gia V: 
(Gia takes slide from toy bag) Lois: That's a slide. 
(Gia taking bendable man from bag) 
(Gia taking Animals book from toy bag) 
(Gia holds up tank car) 
(Gia pointing to book on record-player cabinet) 
(Lois points to Gia's navel) Lois: What's that? 
(Gia holding up jacket) 
(Gia looking at picture of father waving goodbye to 
rest of family) 
(Gia holding lamb up to Lois) 
(Gia pointing to boy figure on form board) 
(Gia holding up Mommy figure) 
here a page 
da baby 
a shoe 








dis tank car 
there's a book 
a belly button 
dis a jacket 
this a bye-bye boy 
dis is lamb 
dat boy t/dis boy ? 
dis a little girl 
Intention 
Gia I-IV (not productive) 
Gia V: 
(Lois just arrived; Gia running into bedroom) 
(Gia hears children in hallway; runs to door and kicks 
it) 
(Gia pointing to book "bridge"; 
then picks it up) 
(Gia and Lois are painting; Lois reaches for brush; 
Gia pulls it back; 
Gia paints) 
(Gia is sitting on train; Lois pushes it; stops; Gia tries 
to move train herself) 
(Gia holding book; 
then opens it) 
(Lois had taken pencil from Gia because she had 
drawn on the counter) 
(Lois is sitting on bench; Gia tries to get on) 
(Gia picks up straw hat; 
tries to put it on) 
(Gia hears a knock at the door; running to door) 
Instrument 
I want go,my toys 
I want see Kevin 
I want take the bridge away 
I'm draw balloon 
I wanta push Gia 
I wanta read it 
I want draw paper 
I want sit a bench 
I want wear it 
I want go door see my Mommy 
Gia I-IV (not productive) . 
Gia V: 




Gia I (not productive) 
Gia II: 
(Gia giving Lois block to fit in larger block) 
(Gia pointing to space on puzzle where baby belongs) 
(Gia takes handful of snapshots to desk) 
(Gia carrying wheels to toy bag) 
Gia III: 
(Gia trying to take blocks out of toy bag) 
(Gia taking blocks to toy bag; 
puts them in bag) 
(Gia picking toy man up; 
drops it into toy bag) 
(Gia holding block; 
then puts it in toy bag) 
(Gia putting Mommy figure into place on form board) 
(Gia pulling train from under bridge) 
(Gia tries to put form board into its cover; can't; 
giving it to Lois) 
(Gia picking up boy figure) 
(Gia looking at picture of boy running after moving 
bus) 
(Gia taking baby figure from form board) 
Gia IV: 
(Gia putting lamb in toy car) 
(Gia reaches for tape box Lois has; 
Gia closes box and puts it on table) 
(Gia sitting on orange chair; Lois standing up; 
then Lois sits on chair with Gia) 
(Mommy is getting ready to go out; Gia goes to closet) 
(Gia climbing off chair) 
(Gia bringing lambs to toy bag; 
drops them into bag) 
(Gia picks up keys; bringing them to bag; 
drops them into bag) 
(Gia holds block) Mommy: Where does that go? (Gia 
putting block in box) 
(Gia putting boy figure on form board) 
(Mommy leaves the house) 
Gia V: 
(Gia putting car driver in truck) 
(Mommy puts on her coat) 
(Gia trying to fit train cars together) 
(Gia sets man on train; while attaching another car to 
train man falls; replacing man on train) 
(Gia taking man and car to bridge) 
(Gia rides her bike; falls) 
(Gia stands on large toy dog) 
(Gia straddles toy train; sitting on it) 
(Lois goes over to couch; Gia sits on couch with book) 
(Gia pointing out window) 
Mommy in 













lamb a go car 
Gia away 
sit the chair/sit orange chair 
me come 
Gia get down 
Gia away a lamb 
away key 
here block a go 
here a man go in 
Mommy go 
man go 
Mommy go bye-bye A 
dis go here 
sit over dere/man sit over dere 
man go an bridge 
I fell down 
stand a wow-wow 
I'm a sit tank car 
Lois sit a couch read a book ? 
I want go outside 
Locative State 
Gia I-II (not productive) 
Gia III: 
(Gia points to picture of baby in a basket) 
(Gia looking at picture of boy in a house) 
(Gia looks in mirror box) Lois: Who's in that box? 
(Gia looking in box again) 







Locative State (Continued) 
Gia IV: 
(referring to trip to the library) Mommy: What did 
we see on the wall? 
Lois: Where's Mommy? (Mommy is in bathroom) 
(Gia pointing to piece of mending tape on page of 
book) 
(While Gia looked in toy box, Lois sat on Gia's chair; 
Gia returns to Lois and chair) 
Gia V: 
(Gia pushes car and driver under book "tunnel"; man 
falls under "tunnel") Lois: Where's the man? 
(Gia pushes car under bridge; it falls onto car) Lois: 
Where's the car? (Gia pointing to car) 
(Gia looks for dump car; finding it) 
(Gia goes to get bottle which is on window ledge next 
to piece of cookie) 
(Gia pointing out window) 
(Gia and Lois are sitting on couch; Gia drinking her 
bottle) 
(Gia looking out window at children on playground) 
(Gia pointing to doll she put on couch) 
(Gia crumpling a plastic-wrapped shirt) 
(Gia tries to lift toy bag) Mommy: Is that heavy? 




man a under tunnel 
here under bridge 
here dump car 
my cookies/my cookie down there 
a somebody down there 
sofa sit/you sit/you a sit couch 
down there Doria 
here a dolly 
paper in there 
yes/is toys in there 
Negation 
Gia I-III (not productive) 
Gia IV (no productive subcategories) 
Gia V: 
(Gia opens book to last page) 
(Gia pointing to last empty coupling on train) Lois: 
What's missing? 
(Gia tying to wind up mechanical car) 
(Gia taking matches from box) 
(Gia runs into bedroom; returning with dry diaper) 
(Gia reaching for dish of pretzels; whining) 
(Gia tries to put lamb in block; can't) 
(Gia puts all figures on form board) Lois: Now can I 
do it? (Gia taking figures off) 
(Gia trying to open bedroom door) Lois: What can't 
you do? 
(Gia pointing to empty space on form board) 
all gone a page 
uh oh missing 
missing tank car_ 
don't break it 
no play matches 
dis a not wet 
can't reach it 
can't do dit 
no now I do a dit 
can't do dit 
can't open open door 
oh oh/baby missing 
Notice 
Gia I-IV (not productive) . 
Gia V: 
(Gia pointing to rabbit in a picture) ooh look at the rabbit 
(child shouts in the hall outside; Gia listens) I hear Kevin! 
(Gia's painting set falls on floor; Gia bends to retrieve 
it; sees her toy car and picks it up) I see my car (Gia looking into toy bag) look in there 
(Gia looking out window) Lois: What do you see? 




Gia I-III (not productive) . 
Gia IV: 
(Gia taking shoes into living room) out here 
(Gia nesting block) in here ? 
Gia V: 
(Gia pushes car into book "bridge") under tunnel/under bridge 
Lois: Where are the cookies? (Gia going into kitchen) in my kitchen 
(Gia tries to attach engine to wrong end of train) 
Lois: I don't think so. Where's the engine go? (Gia 
taking it to opposite end) down here 
Possession 
Gia I (not productive) 
Gia II: 
(Gia pointing to Mommy's face in a photograph) 
(Gia pointing to hat on her doll) 
Gia III: 
(Gia pulling her books from Lois's toy bag) 
(Gia goes to her doll carriage) 
(Gia taking Lois's scarf from her) 
(Gia walks into kitchen; sees Mommy's scarf on 
table; reaching for it) 
(Gia reaches for her friend Kevin's Snoopy pull toy) 
Lois: Whose Snoopy is that? 
Gia IV: 
(Gia pointing to her blankets on floor) 
(Gia picking up her toy telephone) 
(Gia runs into bedroom and lies down on her blanket) 
(Gia gets off her chair; gesturing toward bedroom; 
then goes to bedroom and returns with Curious 
George, a library book) Lois: Whose book is that? 
(Gia holding Lois's keys; looking around for Mom- 
my's keys; 
(sees them and picks them up) 
(Gia runs out of bedroom with Mommy's glasses) 
(Gia tries to put Mommy's glasses on) (Gia pointing to book shelves filled with her parents' 
books) 
(Gia picking up Lois's keys) 
Gia V: 
(Gia runs into living room carrying musical T.V.) 
(Gia sitting on her bike) 
(Gia pointing to computer printout "Happy Birth- 
day" on wall that her uncle gave her) 
Lois: Would you like to come here and read the book? 
(Gia starts toward Lois) 
(Gia climbing off couch; 
gets bottle) 
(Lois points to miniature straw hat of Gia's) Lois: 
Whose hat is that? 
(Mommy takes Gia's spring coat from box) 
(Gia pulling toy bag toward door) 
(Gia picks up pencil Lois had left in Gia's house the 
previous day) 











my library book - 
Gia library book_ 
Mommy key 
Mommy glasses 
Gia on Mommy glasses 
Mommy book 
play Lois keys / 
this a mine toy 
dis a my bike 
dis a mines 
play my toys/play Lois toys 
I'm get my bottle 
Gia hat 
dis a mine/dis a my coat 
bye bye/I'm a go Jeffrey house 
bring a toys 
dis a yours 4 





(Gia scribbles on paper; scribbling some more) 
(Lois rocks clown; Gia tries to rock it and it falls) 
(Gia and Lois had been looking at a book with a 
picture of a rabbit; Gia picks up book, looking for 
picture of rabbit) 
Gia II: 
(Mommy turns off radio) 
(Gia takes out second clown) 
(Gia had been looking at snapshots; pointing to 
snapshots she hasn't looked at yet) 
(Lois pushes block tower over; Gia points to blocks) 
(Lois nests blocks; Gia picking up another block; 
then tries to fit it in) 
(Gia takes figures out of puzzle; handing them to 
Mommy) 
(Gia finishes eating a cookie) 
(Mommy puts baby figure on form board; holds up 
boy figure) Mommy: Who's this? 
(Gia pointing to picture of butterfly) Lois: Butterfly. 
Yes. (Gia pointing to another butterfly) Lois: 
That's not a rabbit, silly. That's also a butterfly. 
(Gia picks up book; turns pages by herself for awhile; 
then holding book out to Mommy) 
Gia III: 
(Gia had been playing with toys and reading Toys 
book; going to toy bag) 
(Gia made tower; knocks it over; starting to stack 
blocks again) 
(Gia stacks blocks and puts car driver on top of stack; 
picking up truck driver; 
tries to put it on top) 
(Gia slides wheel down slide; running after it) 
(Gia connects two train cars; taking more cars out of 
bag) 
(Lois and Gia are playing catch; Gia holding her arms 
out for ball) 
(Gia looking at picture of igloo) Lois: (referring to 
second igloo) What's that? 
(Gia and Lois read book; Gia gets distracted; Gia 
turning back to Lois) 
(Gia picks up second lamb) 
(Gia puts blocks into box; going after another block) 
(Gia picks up boy figure and puts it on form board; 
picking up girl figure) 
Gia IV: 
(Gia and Lois had been reading book a few minutes 
before; Gia holding book) 
(Gia picking up second block) (Gia holding one lamb; picks up second one) (Gia fits blocks together; picking up another one) Gia V: 
(Gia takes clown from toy bag; taking out second 
clown) 




























more read dat 
here another box 
more lamb 
Gia more block 





Gia V (Continued): 
(Lois had drawn balloon; Gia scribbles; pointing to 
scribble) 
(Gia starting to scribble again) 
(Lois winds beads around Gia's neck; beads become 
undone) 
(Lois bounces Gia on her knees, pretending to be 
washing machine; stops) 
(Lois and Gia had played with the slide earlier; Gia 
pulling slide from bag) 
(Gia puts lamb into block because it's "cold"; picking 
up second lamb) 
(Gia completes form board; Lois about to dump 
figures out; Gia pulls it back) Lois: Let's do it 
again. 
(Gia holds out arm for Lois to pinch it; Lois does; Gia 
giving Lois other arm) 
balloon/nother balloon 
I'm draw nother balloon 
again more more bracelet T 
more go washing machine more t 
I'm a the slide more 
nother lamb cold 
I'm do it again 
nother arm 
State 
Gia I-II (not productive) 
Gia III: 
(Mommy is out of the house) Lois: Where's Mommy? 
(Gia reaches for block) 
(train cars become uncoupled) 
(Gia reaching for Daddy figure) 
Gia IV (not productive) 
GiaV: 
(Gia reaches into laundry cart for her overalls) 
(Gia spills milk on floor) 
(Gia starts to draw on counter; Lois trying to take 
pencil from Gia) 
(Gia looking at picture of train in book) 
(Lois opens book; Gia reaching for it) 
(Mommy putting jacket on Gia) 
(Gia holding lamb) 
(Gia and Lois in kitchen) 
(Lois is in kitchen; 
Gia runs into kitchen; gets in her highchair) 
(Gia at crib; doll is inside) 
Mommy work 
I want it 
happen train 
Gia want Daddy 
I want it 
I want paper 
I need it/I want need it 
Lois have train a like dat 
I want my book 
I want a raincoat 
lamb hungry T 
I want a cookie 
I'm hungry 
I want my doll 
Wh-Questions 
Gia I-IV (not productive) 
Gia V: 
(Gia pointing to empty coupling on train) what's a missing dat 
(Gia looking around for car driver) where man go 
(Gia and Lois are reading book; picture of baby 
sleeping) what is the baby doing 
(Gia looking around) where bag go 
(Lois takes hat off and hides it; Gia is surprised) where hat go ] 
(Mommy returns from shopping with several 
packages; Gia pulls packages) what's in a bag 
(Gia looking around) where wheel go 





(Kathryn and Lois had been reading a book; Kathryn 
going after another book) 
(Kathryn sitting on Mommy's lap; Mommy has 
rubber band; Kathryn pushing her hair up toward 
Mommy) 
(Kathryn putting driver in toy car) 
(Kathryn bringing bus with people in it to Lois) 
(Kathryn touching window) Lois: Cold feet! Your feet 
are cold? 
(Lois is about to leave; Kathryn going toward Lois; 
Kathryn kisses Lois) 
(Kathryn at table having lunch; touching glass of 
milk) 
(Mommy and Kathryn are putting animal forms in 
form board; Kathryn trying to fit one; can't) 
(After playing with form board Kathryn goes over to 
rest of toys) 
(Kathryn is lying on bassinette; Mommy folding 
diaper for her) 
Kathryn II: 
(Kathryn taking blocks out of toy bag) 
(Kathryn pointing to her hair that Mommy had just 
washed) 
(Kathryn takes train cars from toy bag) 
(Kathryn has bear book in hand) 
(Kathryn takes Anybody Home; opening to first page) 
(Kathryn taking train cars apart) 
(Kathryn holds pieces of slide out for Lois to assemble 
it) 
(Kathryn taking disk to the slide) 
(Kathryn touching lavaliere mike around her neck) 
(Kathryn looking at picture in magazine of people 
eating) 
Kathryn III: 
(Kathryn sees gifts for Daddy's birthday on table; 
then Kathryn takes gifts off table) 
(Kathryn picks up doll with long hair; pointing to 
side with pigtail Daddy had made) 
(Kathryn gets up and leaving room; 
Kathryn returns with book) 
(slide comes apart; Kathryn trying to fix it) 
(Kathryn looking at picture of man baking bread) 
(Mommy appears in hallway putting ironed shirt on 
hanger) 
(Kathryn putting man in toy car) 
(Kathryn pushing car) 
(Kathryn and Lois have been putting lambs in nesting 
blocks; there's one block too few; Kathryn getting 
up) 
(Kathryn returning with cup) 
a read book 
Mommy pigtail 
this rides 
man ride a bus 
cold/cold feet 




make a house 
Mommy diaper/fold up 
build a house 
Mommy clean hair 
make a choo-choo train 
read bear book 
Kathryn read this 
a take off a this 
do it 
Kathryn do it 
untie this 
eating dinner 
want go get it 
Daddy make a pigtail 
Kathryn go get a book 
a do Lois try this 
man making muffins 
Mommy iron a shirt 
that one take a ride 
I take this one 
a want get a cup 
I got a cup 
Action and Place 
Kathryn I-II (not productive) 
59 
KATHRYN (Continued) 
Action and Place (Continued) 
Kathryn III: 
(Kathryn looking at picture of a doctor in a book) a doctor doing there ' 
(Kathryn and Lois looking out window at children 
playing) those children doing there 
(Kathryn looking at picture of boy jumping in tub) boy jumping in a bathtub 
Attribution 
Kathryn I: 
(Kathryn pointing to tape recorder) 
(Kathryn takes doll sock out of toy box; sock isn't 
dirty) 
(Kathryn picking up wooden peg man) 
(Kathryn dumps dried peas out of jar) 
Lois: Let's go find a book to read. (Kathryn picking 
up baby book) 
(Kathryn looking at doll) 
(Kathryn eating marshmallow) 
(Mommy about to put freshly washed overalls on 
Kathryn; Kathryn had spilled something on them 
the day before) 
(Kathryn putting socks on toy dog) 
(Mommy folding diaper for Kathryn) 
Kathryn II: 
(Lois rolls disk down slide; Kathryn picks up second 
disk; bringing it to slide) 
(Kathryn putting Anybody Home aside) 
(Kathryn trying to put clown figure in block) 
(Kathryn shaking clown which makes noise) 
(Kathryn hears Mommy in hall ready to take laundry 
downstairs) 
(train cars are unhooked) 
(Kathryn pointing to her snowsuit on table) 
(Kathryn pointing to picture in magazine) 
(Lois and Kathryn are putting toys away; two dolls 
are among toys) 
(Kathryn holding lamb) 
Kathryn III: 
(Mommy steps into hallway and puts a freshly ironed 
shirt on hanger) 
(Kathryn picking up two parts of slide) 
(Kathryn and Lois get disks out of bag) Lois: I have 
the yellow wheel. (Kathryn has green disk) 
(Mommy gives Kathryn a metal cup) 
(Lois pretends to fill cup with cereal; hands it to 
Kathryn) 
(Kathryn points to one magnet, then another) 
(Kathryn rolls disk down slide; 
retrieves it) 
(Kathryn picks up little balloon) 
(Lois enters house; Kathryn spreading the skirt of 
her dress) 
(Kathryn pointing to picture of big fish) 
funny chine 
a dirty sock 
funny man 
tiny balls 








funny man in 
tiny ball 
a dirty clothes 
broken train 
snowsuit clean 
that a funny man 
two doll 
fuzzy lamb 
Mommy wearing a clean shirt/ 
Mommy iron a shirt 
this broke 
Kathryn got a this one 
a big cup 
a get some milk 
that's two magnets 
this one a go some more ' 
a little one 
striped skirt/my new striped skirt 




Kathryn I (not productive) 
Kathryn II: 
(Kathryn carrying magazines across room) and there's one for Kathryn 
(Kathryn and Lois pretending to feed lambs) a Mommy give them milk and 
sugar 
Kathryn III: 
(Kathryn taking two disks from Lois) those these for Kathryn 
(Kathryn and Lois are setting table with play dishes; 
Kathryn handing Lois the only cup) Lois cup 
(Kathryn putting out tea set) one for Kathryn/one for Lois 
(Lois pretends to eat) you get some Kathryn 
Existence 
Kathryn I: 
(Lois just put lavaliere mike on Kathryn) 
(Kathryn looking at picture of puppy named Hunky 
Dory in story book) 
(Mommy, Lois, and Kathryn looking out window; 
girl passes by) 
(Kathryn bringing book to Lois) 
Kathryn II: 
(Kathryn taking car from toy bag) 
(Kathryn pointing to lamb) 
(Kathryn pointing to man inside truck) 
(Lois is assembling train) 
(Kathryn looking at picture of dogs) 
(Kathryn pointing to tape recorder) 
(Kathryn taking book from toy bag) 
(Kathryn picking up mirror) 
(Kathryn pointing to mike) 
(Kathryn pointing to picture of woman cooking) 
Kathryn III: 
(Kathryn picks up her new book) Lois: It's a nice 
book. Is it a birthday present? 
(Kathryn and Lois reading book; picture of tiger) 
Lois: You know what that is? 
(Kathryn looking at picture of Mamma Bear) 
(Kathryn opens book and starts naming pictures) 
(Kathryn holding log-puzzle piece) 
(Kathryn holding up bird-puzzle piece) (Lois takes pants off Kathryn's doll) 
(Kathryn picking up lavaliere microphone) 
(Kathryn points to hollow eggshell made of mirrored 
plastic) 
(Kathryn touching Lois's ring) 
this necklace 




that a lamb 
that a man 
that's a train 
that dogs 
that chine 
this a book 
that a mirror 
that a chine 
that's a Mommy 
no/that's a book 
that's tiger 
there Mamma/that's Mamma 
Bear 
ducks/cats/cats there 
this a log 
that bird ? 
there's a behind 
this a necklace 




(Mommy opens refrigerator so Kathryn can see 
pudding) Mommy: You want some pudding? pudding 





(then Kathryn picks up the two pieces of the slide) 
(Kathryn looking for mirror after she put lavaliere 
mike on neck) 
(Kathryn looking for tank car to put clown in) 
(Kathryn and Lois are pretending toy man is going 
for ride to park) 
Kathryn III: 
(Lois and Mommy are sitting on sofa; 
Kathryn sits on sofa) 
(Kathryn at toy bag; 
takes out slide, then train cars from bag) 
(Kathryn pointing to mirrored plastic egg; 
then Kathryn pretends to scramble egg) 
(Kathryn reaching for package for her father) 
(Kathryn looking out window) 
(referring to her dress; 
Lois tries to help Kathryn take dress off) 
(Kathryn takes figures off form board) 
(Kathryn holding tank over slide; 
tries but it falls off) 
(Kathryn takes nested blocks from Lois; 
dumps small ones) 
(Kathryn put blocks on truck; 
Kathryn pushes truck) 
a want slides 
I want a mirror 
want Kathryn a put in a tank 
I want go park 
a want sit down 
a want play with choo-choo train 
a wanta make a egg 
I want open 
a want go see children down there 
I want take this off 
I want try again 
I wanta roll tank 
I wanta dumped out 
a want take for a ride 
Locative Action 
Kathryn I: 
(Kathryn trying to climb on chair) 
(Kathryn picks up book and going toward Mommy) 
Mommy: You want to read a book? Come sit over 
here. 
(Kathryn sits on Mommy's lap) 
(Kathryn putting sweater on a chair) 
(Mommy dressing Kathryn) 
(Kathryn puts sheep in nesting block, which she 
calls "window;" putting another sheep into block) (Lois and Mommy are talking about visiting 
Kathryn's friend Jeremy) 
Kathryn II: 
(Kathryn struggling to put bendable figures on train) 
(Kathryn putting a second man on train) 
(Kathryn putting lambs into nesting block) 
(Kathryn crouching behind T.V.) 
(Kathryn trying to sit on top of nesting blocks) 
(Kathryn taking bendable figure off train) 
(Kathryn trying to climb on piano bench) 
(doorbell rings; Lois entering house) 
(Kathryn pushing train under bridge) 
(Kathryn pushing lamb through windows of doll 
house) 
Kathryn III: 
(Kathryn trying to reach gift on table) 
(Kathryn holding disk in front of slide; 
then Kathryn slides disk) 
(Kathryn putting man in car) 
up Kathryn 
a read book- 
down a lap _ 
sweater chair 
a go outside 
this window/two window 
a go Jeremy 
a go this one 
nother sit down 
lamb a goes/lambs a go into 
Kathryn sit down 
up Kathryn 
off a this 
sit on piano 
Lois came back 
Kathryn under bridge 
lamb go in there 
get it off 
a put this in there 
I put this in there 
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Locative Action (Continued) 
Kathryn III (Continued): 
(Lois puts lambs in blocks; Kathryn putting another 
lamb in another block) lamb go there this one (Lois puts lamb into block) here one fits 
(Kathryn pushing truck under bridge Lois made with 
book) comes a bridge (Kathryn holding puzzle piece) do log goes in there 1 Lois: Mm hm (then Kathryn tries to fit piece in puz- 
zle) 
(Kathryn pointing to where foot-puzzle piece goes) foot goes over here (Kathryn taking puzzle pieces out) a take this off 
(Kathryn rolling disk into block) go in there 
Locative State 
Kathryn I (not productive) 
Kathryn II: 
(Kathryn pointing to blocks in Lois's toy bag that 
are the same as Kathryn's) Kathryn in there! (Kathryn shaking clown which makes noise) tiny balls in there (Kathryn takes rabbit book from toy bag) rabbits a book 
(Lois and Kathryn have been looking for slide; 
Kathryn sees it) there's slide 
(Kathryn pointing to her apron on kitchen table) that's a on the table 
(Kathryn pointing to bananas on the refrigerator) that a banana up here (Kathryn has book with pictures of dragon) Lois: 
Where's the dragon? 
where dragon/red dragon in book (Kathryn looking at magazines stacked on shelf on 
T.V. stand) magazine T.V. (Kathryn looking at man in toy car) that's a man a car 
(Kathryn pointing to picture of horse on block) horse block 
Kathryn III: 
(Kathryn looking at wrapped gifts) tie on it 
(Kathryn turns pages of book looking for picture of 
bank; finding it) there's a one 
(Lois pretends to fill cup with cereal; gives it to 
Kathryn) cereal in there 
(Lois putting doll's shoes on) Lois: Where's the other where other sock 
sock? (Kathryn's sitting on other sock) see my sitting on it (Kathryn looking at picture of bee hive) bees in there 
(Kathryn looking in toy box for another toy man) more in there T (Kathryn looking at picture of baby sitting in chair) baby sitting down in a chair (Kathryn looking at picture of cat) there's a cat sitting there (Kathryn pointing to books on top shelf of bookcase) there's Humpty Dumpty up there 
Negation 
Kathryn I: 
(Kathryn tries to put rubber band on her finger; 
can't) no fit 





(Kathryn is wearing pants) Lois: Is Kathryn wearing 
a skirt? 
(Kathryn trying to fit pieces of slide together) 
(toy car is stuck under bridge) 
(Kathryn wants mirror to look at mike around her 
neck; mirror isn't in sight) 
(Kathryn looks for tank car; can't find it) 
(Kathryn is barefoot) 
(Lois and Kathryn are reading book; Kathryn looking 
up at Lois who hasn't a hat) 
(Kathryn has no socks on) 
(Kathryn shaking head "no") 
(Mommy offering car to Kathryn) Mommy: There's 
the truck. 
Kathryn III: 
(Kathryn looking at picture of baker making bread) 
(Lois hadn't brought her train) 
(Kathryn takes arm-puzzle piece off board; pointing 
to empty space) 
(Kathryn pointing to block which has no label) 
(Lois puts train cars together; Kathryn looking in 
box for more cars) 
(Lois and Kathryn reading Smalls, not Anybody 
Home) 
(Lois and Kathryn are looking out window) Lois: A 
truck. What else do you see? (There is no boy) 
(Kathryn is looking at "C" page of alphabet book; 
after pointing to cat, Kathryn points to chick) 
(Lois hadn't brought lambs) 
(Kathryn tries to climb behind playpen; can't; 




mirror all gone 
no find a tank 
Kathryn wear shoes 
Lois no hat 
Kathryn have a socks on 
me like coffee/Lois a no coffee 
no truck 
not making muffins/making breads 
didn't bring a choo-choo train 
a no hand there 
this one have no 
no more choo-choo train 
that not body home 
no boy 
that not cat 
no bring lambs 
Kathryn not go over here 
Notice 
Kathryn I (not productive) 
Kathryn II: 
(Kathryn trying to turn page of book) look at more 
(Kathryn looking in mirror) I see Kathryn in mirror 
(Kathryn reading Smalls book) a see houses 
(Kathryn trying to twirl key ring on her finger) watch it 
Kathryn III: 
(Kathryn looking at picture of bear with scissors) look what other bear have 
(Kathryn had put man in car) look a put (Kathryn looking at picture of animals in book) a see ducks! 
(Kathryn looking at reflection in mirrored egg) see Lois an face 
(Kathryn showing Lois picture of rabbit on page she just turned) look a found a rabbit 
(Kathryn looking at picture of bears in book) I see a bears 
(Kathryn hears noise of children playing outside) a hear childrens! 





(Kathryn and Lois are looking at picture of girl with 
dress on; Lois pointing to dress) Lois: See the girl. 
What's that? 
(Kathryn has letter from Grandma; there is a picture 
of a garden on the stationery) 
(Mommy gives Kathryn some of Mommy's apple) 
(Mommy makes Kathryn a pretend sock out of toilet 
tissue) Mommy: That's your sock. There. 
(Kathryn pointing to toy sheep's ear) 
(Kathryn has pair of Mommy's socks) 
Kathryn II: 
(Kathryn picks up book of Lois's which is similar to 
book Kathryn has) 
(Kathryn getting Lois's book from toy bag) 
(Kathryn pointing to tape recorder) 
(Kathryn pointing into kitchen to her apron on table) 
(Kathryn picking up Lois's keys) 
(Kathryn pointing to newspaper) 
(Kathryn pointing to books on piano) 
(Kathryn steps on her book) 
(Kathryn pointing to her box of toys) 
(Kathryn pointing to Lois's socks) 
Kathryn III: 
(Kathryn pointing to Daddy's gifts on table) 
(Kathryn pointing to her puzzle) 
(Kathryn pointing to picture of nesting blocks similar 
to hers in book) 
(Kathryn pointing to her party hat) 
(Kathryn picking up her new book) 
(Kathryn takes doll from Lois; trying to button doll's 
pants) 
(Kathryn getting her stuffed dog) 
(Kathryn running into living room looking for her 
balloons) 
(Kathryn takes thermometer from doctor bag) 
(Kathryn and Lois are reading book; referring to 







Kathryn my book 
get my book 
that Lois chine 
that Kathryn apron 
that's a Lois keys 
that Daddy paper 
Mommy library books 
step my Kathryn book 
thas my Kathryn toys 
that Lois socks 
that's Daddy's birthday 
that's my puzzle/that's Kathryn 
puzzle 
those Kathryn 
there my hat 
this my book/that my book 
that's her button 
there my doggie 
I find my balloons 
this my mometer 
Mommy hangs my socks up 
Place 
Kathryn I (not productive) 
Kathryn II: 
(Kathryn looking at picture of airplane) up in sky (toy car is stuck under bridge; Kathryn reaching for 
it) a under bridge (Lois and Kathryn looking for disk for slide) Lois: Do 
you see it? 
behind a chair 
(Kathryn pushing car under chair) under chair 
(Lois pulling train under bridge) under bridge 
Kathryn III (not productive) 
Recurrence 
Kathryn I: 




Kathryn I (Continued): 
(Kathryn picking up second hair curler) 
(Kathryn pretending to feed toy cat) 
(Kathryn finishes eating nuts) 
(Mommy is giving Kathryn a bath; finishes lathering 
her) 
(Mommy pretends to pin a toilet tissue sock on 
Kathryn; Kathryn wants another "pin" for the 
other "sock") 
(Kathryn finishes eating raisins) 
Kathryn II: 
(Kathryn putting second man on train) 
(Kathryn knocks block house down) 
(Lois and Kathryn have been reading a magazine; 
Kathryn getting up; 
Kathryn gets stack of magazines and returns to 
Lois) 
(Lois pushes car through Kathryn's; legs Kathryn 
squeals and laughs) 
(Kathryn struggling to get last lamb out of bag) 
(Kathryn pushes lamb under bridge; bridge collapses) 
(Kathryn knocks block house down) Lois: Shall I 
build another house? 
(Kathryn pointing to picture of lady with apron on; 
pointing to picture of girl with apron on) 
(Kathryn drops toys and small blocks through hole in 
large block; getting up to pick toys and blocks up) 
(Mommy rolls disk down slide) 
Kathryn III: 
(Kathryn points to gift; 
points to another) 
(Kathryn pointing to ear-puzzle piece) 
(Kathryn puts puzzle piece on board; picking up 
another piece) 
(Kathryn points to picture of spider in book; looks 
through book to find another spider; finding one) 
(Kathryn had completed puzzle; Lois takes it apart; 
Kathryn starts to put it together) 
(Kathryn knocks block tower down; 
stacks them again) 
(Lois puts two train cars together; Kathryn looking in box for more) 
(Lois and Kathryn are pretending to have lunch) 
(Kathryn stacks blocks; they fall; 
Lois helps Kathryn stack blocks) 
(Mommy gives Kathryn piece of paper; Kathryn 
drops it on floor) 
nother hair curl 




a more raisin 
nother one 
make a house again 
more magazine 
do again 
get another one 
make a more under more 
Kathryn want build another house 
apron on 1 
apron tool 
Kathryn a make again 
again one 
this Daddy's birthday present/ 
there's another 
this another ear 
this a other one q 
ugly spider 1 
there's another ugly] 
a do again 
I make a more 
get a more 
I want some more egg 
Lois put on more block T 
nother piece a paper 
State 
Kathryn I: 
(Kathryn looking at picture of baby asleep in crib) 
(Kathryn and Lois walk into kitchen; Mommy is 
there) 
(Kathryn eating lunch) Mommy: You'll take a nap in 
a little while. 
(Kathryn and Lois looking out window) 
baby tired 
Mommy busy 






(Kathryn looking at picture of cat sleeping in window 
box) 
(Kathryn bringing disks for slide to Lois) 
(Kathryn and Lois looking at picture of family eating) 
(Kathryn looking at picture of boy lying down) 
(Kathryn and Lois using nesting blocks as houses) 
Lois: Lois has two houses. What does Kathryn 
have? 
(Kathryn looking at picture of woman sleeping) 
(Kathryn shaking head "no") 
(Kathryn pointing to her overalls) 
(Kathryn and Lois playing in living room; Mommy 
is in other room) 
(Kathryn looking at picture of cat) 
Kathryn III: 
(Kathryn holding disks) 
(Kathryn giving disk to Lois) 
(Kathryn "feeding" lamb) 
(Kathryn looking at picture of man hanging up 
clothes) 
(Kathryn pointing to book) 
(Kathryn pointing to envelope with flash cards in it) 
(Kathryn holding red disk) 
(Kathryn and Lois are pretending to have a tea party) 
Lois: Do you like nuts? 





Kathryn one houses 
lady tire 
me like coffee 
Kathryn have red pants 
Mommy busy now 
pussycat tire 
I have these 
Lois have this 
like a cereal ' 
gets dry 
a want that book 
I need this 
Kathryn want a red one 
a want some tea 
yes/Kathryn me like crackers 
a want some food 
Wh-Questions 
Kathryn I (not productive) 
Kathryn II: 
(Kathryn pointing to label on car) 
(Kathryn takes train from toy bag) 
(Kathryn picking up mike) 
(car gets stuck under bridge) 
(toy bridge collapses) 
(Kathryn looking for mirror) 
(Kathryn has toy driver of car; looking for car) 
(toy clown falls over) 
Kathryn III: 
(Kathryn pointing to Indian in picture book) 
(Lois and Kathryn are looking at book; bank is not 
on this page) 
(Kathryn looking at picture of bird taking bite of 
cake) 
(Kathryn pointing to picture of Daddy Bear) 
(Kathryn takes car with seat for driver from toy bag) 
(Kathryn tries to put big puzzle piece in small spot) 
Lois: Too big. 
(Kathryn puts puzzle piece on board; looking for 
another piece) 
(Kathryn pointing to magnet on puzzle) 
(Kathryn puts dress-puzzle piece on puzzle; girl's 
legs are covered by the dress) 
(Lois puts shoes on doll; one doll sock is in sight) 
what's that 
what's this 
what's in this/what's in that 
a what happens 
where's a bridge 
where's a mirror 
where the car 
what happen 
what's that 
where put your money in 
what's that down there 
what's this 
where's a man 
where a little one 
where's a other one 
what's that on there 
where's legs are 




Peter I-II (not productive) 
Peter III: 
(Peter touching window-shade pull) 
(Peter pointing to T.V.) 
Peter IV: 
(string of pull toy is tangled around toy) 
(Peter looking at tape-recorder reels) 
(Peter pushes buttons on tape recorder) 
(Peter pointing to light button on tape recorder) 
(Peter's baby sister is crying loudly) 
(Peter putting train cars together) 
(Peter had separated train cars) 
(Peter and Lois had just made a house of blocks) 
Lois: You wanna make a house again? 
(Lois and Peter pushing cars through tunnel) 
(Peter takes roof of tunnel off; reaching in to pull car 
through) 
Peter V: 
(Peter holding toy screwdriver out to Patsy) 
(Patsy's hand is on trunk of car) 
(Peter holding screwdriver and windshield) 
(Peter pointing to microphone which is in his way on 
the floor) 
(Peter trying to close hood of car, but it's too full of 
toy people) 
(Peter holding toy lady that goes in car) 
(Peter picks up car by tires; looking at tires) 
(Peter putting tire back on car) 
(Peter pointing to steering wheel which also unscrews 
as do tires) 
(Lois puts bolts on her finger and Peter's finger as 
"rings"; Peter looking for more bolts) 
Peter VI: 
(Lois takes out car box from toy bag) 
(Peter pointing to car engine which unscrews) (Peter pointing to side panel of car) 
(Peter touching light button on tape recorder) 
(Peter pointing to tape-recorder buttons that are 
partially hidden by leather case) 
(Peter turning pull toy right side up) 
(Peter using screwdriver on car) 
(Peter holding two finger puppets out to Lois) 
(Peter at open tape recorder; then closes it) 
(Peter had just turned lamp on; going back to it; then 
turns it off) 
Peter VII: 
(Peter tries to fix toy telephone; can't; holding it out 
to Lois) 
(Peter has recording tape which is unwinding; Lois 
tries to take it from him) 
(Peter reaching for box of bendable people) (Peter putting car on the slide) (Peter running to other side of room to get magazine) (Peter ready to write on paper) Patsy: What're you 
going to write? 
(Patsy and Peter are drawing faces) 
pull it 
turn it 
oh fix it 
turn it I 




I did it 
tunnel/make tunnel 
I get them 
I get it 
screw it 
close it l 











I turn the light on 
open the buttons 
turn it over 
I do it 
try this 
close it 
turn it on 
fix it 
a my wind up 
open this 
car ride 
my get magazine 
make a car 




Peter VII (Continued): 
(Peter pushes button that turns on tape-recorder 
light) a turn on a light! 
(Peter looking around for a second sheep) get another one 
(Peter bringing his paper to Lois) you write 
Action and Place 
Peter I-VI (not productive) 
Peter VII: 
(Peter holding box of recording tape; pointing to tape 
recorder) there's a tape go round right 
there q 
(Peter writing on paper) on my paper write 
(Peter spinning tires on truck) a wheels go round right there 
(Peter comes over to Lois; pointing to her paper) wanna write there 
(Peter gives Mommy pencil and pulls car over to her; 
car has piece of masking tape on it where Lois had 
written "Peter" several weeks ago)" write Patsy a write truck 
(Peter trying to put bendable boy in car) boy take a ride in there 
Attribution 
Peter I-II (not productive) . 
Peter III: 
(Peter playing with train cars) 
(Peter looking at tape-recorder buttons) 
Peter IV: 
(Lois, Patsy, and Peter get off elevator; walk to 
Peter's apartment door; Peter touches door knob) 
(Peter putting tape on his face, like a beard) 
(Peter holding box for recording tape) 
(Peter pointing to two wheels) 
(Peter and Lois push cars through block tunnel which 
is too narrow) 
(Peter finds big block; giving it to Lois) 
Peter V: 
(Peter takes toy car and truck that he's never seen 
before from bag) 
(Peter looking for new truck) 
Patsy: I think we should turn on a light. Which light 
light should we turn on? (Peter running to lamp 
near kitchen) 
(Peter reaching for car under table instead of one on 
table) 
Peter VI: 
(Peter pointing to one then another chimney out the 
window) 
(Peter standing next to hissing radiator) 
(Peter playing with dirty piece of masking tape) 
(Peter has two finger puppets: a dog, and a donkey) 
(Peter turning lights on) 
(Patsy holds up pen and pencil for Peter to choose) 














that's hot there 
this is this is dirt 
two dogs 
two lights 
two pens/big pens 





Peter VI (Continued): 
(Peter pointing to tape-recorder reels) 
(Peter flies his toy plane around the room; hears 
plane outside; then holding up five fingers) 
(Peter picks up second giraffe) 
(Peter goes to Mommy in kitchen; holding up two 
fingers) 
Peter VII: 
(Peter pulls two alligators from ark) 
(Peter looking at tape on tape recorder) 
(Patsy and Peter draw "happy" faces; Peter pointing 
to his drawing) 
(Peter puts a pen and pencil in Patsy's pocketbook) 
(Peter had previously used turned-over slide as a 
runway for his cars; taking slide apart) 
(Peter moves microphone; pats it) 
(Peter rolls wheels and small toys down slide; crashes 
them; laughs) 
(Patsy putting corn chips on Peter's plate) 
(Peter eating his lunch) 
(Peter tries to hook train cars together; can't; showing 
it to Patsy) 
all finished that f 
two airplanes 
two giraffes 
pretzel please/two pretzels/one 
two pretzels 
two alligators 
finished that one too 
happy face 
that's two pens ' 
wrong side 




that broken right there 
Existence 
Peter I-II (not productive) 
Peter III: 
(Peter on his bike) 
(Peter pretending he sees friend in mirror box) 
Peter IV-V (not productive) 
Peter VI: 
(Peter showing screwdriver to Lois) 
(Peter pointing to sheep) 
(Peter pulling tiny truck from toy bag) 
(Peter getting donkey finger puppet) 
Peter VII: 
(Peter taking bendable daddy from box) 
(Peter showing bendable daddy to Lois) 
(Peter pointing to microphone) 
(referring to bendable baby) 
(Lois draws a car; Peter pointing to it) 
(Peter picking up wagon pull toy) 
(Peter holding up book for Patsy and Lois to see) 
(Telephone rings; Mommy goes to answer it; Peter 
follows) 
(Peter showing baby sister box of recording tape) (Peter giving unboxed recording tape to Lois) 
a bike 
a Butch 
this is screw 
that there 
the truck 
that's a mouse ] 
a daddy 
this is daddy 
that a microphone 
a boy 
here's a car 
this is wagon 




here's a tape recorder Patsy 
Locative Action 
Peter I-IV (not productive) 
Peter V: 
(Peter trying to put headlight on car) 
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Locative Action (Continued) 
Peter V (Continued): 
(Peter pushes car but one tire is off so it won't roll 
smoothly) 
(Patsy holds jack up; Peter pointing to its place in 
car) 
(Peter putting screwdriver under hood) 
(Peter putting tiny car under finger-puppet's skirt) 
Peter VI: 
(Mommy picks up Peter's baby sister and walks out 
of living room) 
(Peter putting tools back on car) 
(Peter taking tools out of car and putting them back 
in) 
(Peter putting piece of masking tape on his face) 
(Peter putting screwdriver inside finger-puppet's 
skirt) 
(Peter putting bendable Mommy on top of wooden 
man) 
(Mommy is holding Peter in arms; Peter reaching 
down to put pen and paper on counter) 
(Patsy had just put her hat on) 
(Peter looking at Patsy who is standing up next to 
dining-room table) 
(Peter trying to put pencil on counter) 
Peter VII: 
(Peter indicating place on toy telephone where de- 
tached wire belongs) 
(Peter climbing up on his rocking horse in order to 
see fire engine out the window) 
(Peter aligns the two parts of the slide) 
(Peter holding recording tape) 
(Peter trying to fit large wooden man on seesaw) 
(Peter attaching pull toy to handlebars of his tricycle) (Peter holding Lois's barrette to his head, looking at 
Lois) 
(Peter standing on couch; 
then gets down) 
(Peter putting recording tape in its box) 
wheel back 4 
put it here 
I put back 
goes an there 
baby go 
put it there 
it goes/screw out 
tape here 
goes in there 
put up here 
put that 
put on/hat on 
sit there 
pencil down there 
a put in there 
am gonna get a horsie see it 
goes right here! 
put this down I 
goes in there 
put on right there 
put in hair please 
a gotta get down 
tape recorder goes in there 
Locative State 
Peter I-V (not productive) 
Peter VI: 
(Peter looking at end of train car that has no hook) no more there (Peter pointing to lamp) light there (Peter showing animals in ark to Patsy and Lois) giraffe there 
(Peter pointing to chair Patsy is sitting in) chair right there Peter VII: 
(Peter showing his baby sister a box of recording tape) there's a tape in there (Peter pointing to bus in street) over there is a bus 
(Peter trying to open box of bendable people) daddy in a there (Peter sees bendable mommy that he had been looking 
for) there a mommy right there (Peter notices that tiny truck has a spare tire) more wheel on a truck (Peter looking at tape recorder) tape recorder right there (Peter noticing piece of masking tape on car) tape on truck (Peter pointing to pens on the floor) pens right there 
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Locative State (Continued) 
Peter VII (Continued): 
(Peter touching barrette in his hair) my barrette's on 
(Peter and Patsy are in kitchen getting Peter's lunch) 
Patsy: Show me where the chicken is. (Peter point- 
ing to refrigerator) chicken in there 
Negation 
Peter I-V (not productive) 
Peter VI: 
(Peter looks for monkey in ark; doesn't find one) no monkey 
(Peter closes trunk of car with spare tire in it) bye-bye wheel 
Peter VII (no productive subcategories) 
Notice 
Peter I-V (not productive) . 
Peter VI: 
(Peter pointing to smoke out window) look at that 
(Peter has finger puppetO look at this 
(Peter looking at recording-tape box on floor) look at down there 
Peter VII (not productive) . 
Possession 
Peter I-II (not productive) . 
Peter III: 
(Peter looking at his pencil and Patsy's pencil) my pencil/Patsy's pencil 
Peter IV-V (not productive) . 
Peter VI: 
(Peter reaching for his pen and paper which are out 
of reach; whimpering) my pen 
(Peter reaching down for paper) my paper 
(Peter pointing to Patsy's pocketbook on floor where 
pen Peter was using is) my pen down there 
(Patsy and Peter watch airplane take off outside: 
then Peter picks up his toy airplane; flying it) my airplane 
Peter VII: 
(Peter gesturing with barrette to Lois's hair) Patsy hair right there 
(Peter eating lunch) that my bologna 
(Peter taking bendable girl from Patsy) a that mine 
(Peter holding Lois's barrette to his head) that's my 
(Peter touching barrette in his hair) my barrette's on 
(Peter pointing to Patsy's paper) that Patsy 
(Peter holds recording tape; it starts to unwind) Lois: 
Why don't you put it back in the box and give it 
to me? 
oh no/mine it/a mine it 
(Peter showing baby sister his pen) my pen Jenny 
(Mommy comes in to see what Peter's been doing; 
Peter points to his drawing paper; tapping it) that mine/that mine 
(Peter looking at Patsy's pen on floor) that's a Patsy's pen 
Recurrence 





(Peter playing with toy cars; one has seat; other 
doesn't; has peg person in hand) 
(Peter holding two toy cars; 
looking for another; 
finding another) 
(Peter finding peg boy) 
(Peter holding disks for slide; 
then rolls them) 
(Peter pointing out window at street light; 
at another one) 
(Peter reaching for more train cars) 
Peter IV: 
(Patsy had taped peg boys to train; Peter looking at 
it; 
Peter bringing roll of tape) 
(Patsy was talking about turning the recording tape 
over; Peter reaching for second box of tape in bag) 
(Peter holding up another finger puppet) 
(Peter tries to put peg man in hole in truck; doesn't 
fit; putting boy in hole instead) 
(Peter reaching for Lois's barrette after staring at her 
hair) 
Peter V: 
(Peter holding another toy headlight out to Patsy) 
(Peter trying to take second bolt off car) 
(Peter picking up car and its box) 
(Peter had eaten cookie in kitchen; now he, Patsy, 
and Lois are in living room about to put the toys 
away) 
Peter VI: 
(Peter searching for fourth flat car after finding three) 
(Peter had been putting masking tape on toys; hold- 
ing roll of tape) 
(Peter adds block to circle of blocks he and Lois are 
building; 
then gets another block) 
Peter VII: 
(Peter picking up fourth train car) 
(Lois had just drawn car; Peter gesturing that he 
wants Patsy to draw a car now) 
(Peter draws, then Patsy draws) 
(Peter noticing one empty seat on seesaw) 
(Peter running to kitchen; he had a snack a while ago) 
(Peter hears tape-recorder feedback; gets box of 
recording tape; opening it) 
(Peter looking at recording tape in box) 
(Peter has box of recording tape in hand; excitedly 
looking from tape in hand to tape recorder) 
(Peter notices spare tire on tiny truck; picking up 
truck) 










more train , 
more tape ' 
more one { 
more doggie 
more man 




more put put back 
more cookie 
- 
need a more 
more tape ? 
get a more 
this is more 
me make a car too 
make it too 
need a more 
more chips please 
more tape 
more tape goes around 
more tape recorder right there I 
bet/more tape recorder right 
there all finish 
more wheel a truck 
get some more nother one ' 
State 





(Mommy goes out of room with part of toy telephone; 
Peter running after her) need it/my need it 
(Mommy enters room) a want milk please 
(Mommy gives Peter corn chip; he wants the bag) need a chip Mommy 
(Peter tapping paper where Lois had drawn a house) want a house like that 
(Peter touching barrette in his hair) this hurt 
(Patsy, Lois, and Peter in kitchen; Peter choosing 
what he wants for lunch) want the bologna 
Wh-Questions 
Peter I-V (not productive) . 
Peter VI: 
(radiator hisses) s aet noise 
(Peter dumps car out of box; looking at it) what's in there 
(Peter unscrewing tire) what's that there 
(Peter pointing to engine on car) what's this 
Peter VII: 
(Peter noticing new microphone) what's that 
(Peter noticing truck has a spare tire) what's that there 
(Peter gets toy airplane; all the peg people are missing) where the people go 
(Peter pointing out window at smoke coming from 
road) what's that down there 
(Peter looking out window at park; no dog has come 
into view) where doggies go 
(Peter noticing train car is missing a plastic disk) where is it 
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COMMENTARY AND REPLY 
COMMENTARY BY MELISSA BOWERMAN 
The issues which the authors of this Monograph undertake to explore 
are complex, challenging, and of the greatest relevance to our current state 
of knowledge about the processes involved in language acquisition. Two im- 
portant research questions are posed. First, is there a consistent order in 
which children acquire the ability to encode various relational notions syn- 
tactically? Second, can the variation which exists among children be de- 
scribed systematically, within the limits imposed by a shared sequence of 
acquisition? The conclusions the investigators arrive at are plausible and 
intriguing, and are accompanied by interesting discussions of related theo- 
retical issues such as possible determinants for sequential acquisition, and 
the relationship between cognitive, semantic, and syntactic development. 
However, some of the findings are not conclusively demonstrated by the 
data and so should be the subject of some lively discussion and debate, 
as well as the inspiration for further studies designed to substantiate them. 
This is a measure of the difficulties involved in finding ways to investigate 
the questions asked in this study and in evaluating the relative merits of dif- 
ferent interpretations of the same set of data. 
In my remarks below, I have selected three issues for consideration. 
The first is an examination of a methodological problem in the design of the 
research which renders some of the central findings of the study equivocal 
because the data they are based on can too readily be explained in a dif- 
ferent and less interesting way. This problem reflects a difficulty in trying to 
establish orders of emergence from spontaneous-speech data which is very 
general, extending well beyond the scope of this study itself. Following this 
section is a consideration of the potential "psychological reality" of the 
semantic-syntactic categories used to classify children's utterances. The final 
section is an exploration of the issue taken up by Bloom et al. concerning 
whether children at the two- and three-word stage of development have 
knowledge of syntactic concepts like "subject" and "predicate." 
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A Methodological Problem 
Brown, Cazden, and Bellugi-Klima (1969) have observed that "in certain 
facts concerning construction frequencies there lies a major trap for the stu- 
dent of child speech who is interested in the development of knowledge of 
grammar. The first fact is that in mother-to-child speech the various construc- 
tions that English grammar permits are of grossly unequal frequency. The sec- 
ond fact is that the frequencies are astonishingly stable across the three moth- 
ers in our study [of Adam, Eve, and Sarah]. The third fact is that the fre- 
quencies in child speech, within the limits of the child's competence, tend to 
match adult frequencies." Brown et al. go on to point out the trap, which is 
that, when children emit constructions with unequal frequencies, the use of 
an arbitrary frequency criterion to establish that a form is productive for 
a child could cause the more frequently produced constructions to appear 
to become productive earlier than the less frequently produced constructions, 
even though this might not be the case. Suppose that, in fact, children have 
ability with all the types of constructions under investigation from the begin- 
ning but produce these with a frequency profile like that of their parents. 
"The chance that any particular construction would attain an arbitrary fre- 
quency criterion in an early sample would be greater for frequent construc- 
tions than for infrequent constructions. So what looked like a pattern of 
successive 
'emergences' might simply be a kind of sampling phenomenon" (Brown & Hanlon 1970). In other words, the more frequent forms "would 
appear first on a strict probability basis. The student of child speech might then conclude that the hypothesis of simultaneous development was false 
when it could indeed still be true" (Brown et al. 1969; italics added). 
This warning appears to be directly applicable to the interpretation of 
certain of Bloom et al.'s findings. The authors first outline a number of 
semantic-syntactic categories into which they classify the utterances pro- duced by their subjects. They then try to determine whether children gain 
knowledge of how to produce utterances in these categories in a particular 
developmental order. Rightly recognizing that a child's productive (i.e., rule- 
governed) ability cannot be established on the basis of only one or two 
utterances (memorization would be too plausible an alternative explanation), 
they decide to consider a category productive only if "five or more utterance 
types were observed in the category in the data from a particular child in 
a particular sample" (p. 9). Using this criterion of productivity, they found 
(among other things) that "encoding of action events [action and locative 
action] preceded encoding of stative events [locative state, state, and notice]; 
and nonlocative relations were generally encoded before locative relations" 
(p. 16). In addition, action-plus-place did not become productive until after 
locative action. 
In considering possible determinants of this order of acquisition, the 
authors note that the relative frequency of utterances in these categories in the speech of the children's parents matched the order of emergence, 
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such that "action was more frequent than locative action, locative state, and 
notice, in that order" (p. 25). They rule out frequency as an important de- 
terminant of order of emergence, however, because certain other construction 
patterns such as wh-questions and attributives were even more frequent 
than action relations in the speech of parents, yet these were apparently 
acquired relatively late by the children. However, the authors evidently did 
not consider the additional possibility that the apparent sequence of emer- 
gence itself was an illusion, created by the use of an arbitrary frequency 
criterion of productivity (five utterances in a sample) coupled with unequal 
frequencies of production by the children-frequencies which for at least 
certain of the categories (action, locative action, locative state, notice) 
matched in rank order of those of the parents. 
The figures presented in table 2 of the Monograph tend to support this 
interpretation. The table shows the proportion and number of utterances in 
the different categories in each sample for each child. The verb categories 
(e.g., "action") which appear to have emerged earliest on the basis of the 
child's producing five or more utterances of that type are also proportion- 
ately the most frequent throughout the samples. Those which are said to 
emerge later (e.g., "locative state," "action and place") are proportionately 
less frequent, both in those samples in which they are finally considered 
productive and in subsequent samples. Utterances in several of the "later- 
emerging" categories constitute a relatively stable proportion of the total 
number of multiword utterances in each sample from the earliest samples for 
a particular child; sometimes the proportion even decreases slightly. Yet, 
because sample size was not held constant but, rather, increased dramati- 
cally as the children matured (more multiword utterances could be col- 
lected in a given unit of time during the later samplings), the absolute fre- 
quencies of these utterances rise in later samples, such that the frequency 
criterion of five instances is finally met. For example, the category "notice" 
is said to emerge late for all the children, well after "action" and "locative 
action." In the samples in which "notice" is said to become productive for 
Eric, Gia, and Kathryn, "notice" utterances constituted only 1% of the total 
multiword corpus; for Peter it was 2%. However, "notice" utterances did 
occur in earlier samples of all the children. When a child emits constructions 
of a certain pattern relatively infrequently such that they account for only 
1% of all his word combinations, 500 of his constructions must be col- 
lected on the average before five exemplars of the pattern will be found-and 
the earlier samples collected for the children were not nearly this large. For 
Eric, there is the paradox that, although "notice" constructions constitute 
10%, 3%, and 3% of the first three samples, respectively, the category is 
not considered productive until the fourth sample, even though at this time 
it constituted only 1% of the total. This is because the first three samples 
consisted of only 10, 39, and 108 construction types (semantically distinct 
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constructions), respectively, while the fourth sample is far larger at 427 
constructions. 
Similar observations could also be made about the consistently low 
proportions of utterances in several of the other "late" emerging categories 
(e.g., locative state, state). The proportions of utterances falling into the 
categories said to emerge earlier (e.g., action) are almost always far higher. 
It is clear that the use of an arbitrary frequency criterion to establish pro- 
ductivity could easily cause utterances which are produced relatively infre- 
quently to appear to emerge later than more frequent ones, even though 
a child might have been consistently producing utterances in each category 
from the start. 
The caution that certain categories may only appear to have emerged 
late due to the way in which productivity was established is primarily appli- 
cable to those categories in which the children produced at least a few 
utterances from early on. There are some categories in which particular chil- 
dren produced virtually no utterances, sample after sample (e.g., instrument 
for all the children, intention for Eric and Peter, wh-questions for Gia and 
Peter). While the appearance of a later emergence for these categories may 
also be an artifact of the method of analysis, there is a strong possibility 
that a genuine onset of ability is reflected in the sample in which such utter- 
ances finally start to appear. In this case, the delay would really be due to 
some extra cognitive, semantic, or syntactic difficulties which these construc- 
tions involve. 
How can an investigation of the order in which children acquire a 
productive ability with constructions of various kinds be conducted so as 
to avoid the ambiguous outcome described here? At a minimum, sample size 
would need to be held constant (and large) rather than allowed to increase 
as the child matures. In this way, construction patterns with which a child is 
fluent but which he emits relatively infrequently would have as good a chance 
of being represented in the early samples as in the later ones. If under these 
conditions certain constructions are still absent or extremely rare in the early 
samples and begin to proliferate only later, one may be more certain that 
the emergence is real. Brown et al. (1969) make other methodological sug- 
gestions, arguing for "the utilization of data that are better indices of knowl- 
edge or competence than is an arbitrary frequency of production." For exam- 
ple, they suggest that one can compare child frequencies to known adult 
frequencies and "so set frequency criteria that are not entirely arbitrary." There are no doubt several other ways to approach the problem which would 
allow the question Bloom et al. pose about order of emergence to be 
answered more conclusively, but these will not be pursued here. 
The Psychological Reality of the Categories 
Let us assume that a study with adequate controls against the effects of 
different relative frequencies of production would substantiate Bloom et al.'s 
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finding that children acquire the ability to produce utterances in the cate- 
gories in a certain developmental order. Would this mean that the cate- 
gories are "psychologically real"-that they correspond to concepts which are 
functional in a child's own system of grammatical rules? 
Bloom et al.'s position on this is not entirely clear. On the one hand, 
they caution wisely that "the taxonomy of linguistic structures that has been 
presented here is a linguistic description of speech data that can represent 
the child's knowledge and changes in the child's knowledge in only a very 
gross way. There is no way of knowing, at the present time, the form in 
which such knowledge about linguistic structure is represented in the child's 
mental grammar" (p. 33). On the other hand, however, they argue that "the 
categories were not a superimposed a priori system of analysis," but rather 
were 
"presumably derived from an individual child's own rule system and 
were, therefore, functional for the child" (p. 9). They do not elaborate on 
what they mean by "functional." 
One possible interpretation of the term might be that the categories 
correspond to concepts which children actually use in producing (and pre- 
sumably understanding) utterances (see Bowerman 1974, pp. 201-202; 
Brown 1973, pp. 173, 118, 146). For example, children might generalize 
their existing knowledge (e.g., of appropriate word order) to novel con- 
structions along the lines suggested by terms like "action" and "notice." If 
this were the case, then children would regard all action verbs (or, more 
accurately, their referents) as similar to each other in some sense, such that 
constructions involving "open," "cut," "make," "dance," etc., would all be 
produced by reference to the same body of information about sentence 
structure. This information would be broad enough to allow the distinctions 
between different kinds of simple actions to be disregarded for purposes of 
sentence construction, but not so broad as to allow the formulation of "notice" 
strings with "see" or "hear," or "state" strings with "want" or "have." Pro- 
ducing these latter types of sentences would require recourse to information 
which would either be somewhat different from, or at least an elaboration of, 
the knowledge governing action constructions. 
However, the discovery that the various categories of construction 
emerge sequentially would not in itself provide enough grounds for con- 
cluding that all the utterances classified together are actually seen by the 
child as similar in some sense (although this would of course be a possi- 
bility warranting further exploration). Most of the categories are hetero- 
geneous, in that they embrace a variety of distinguishable subcategories. The 
knowledge with which children construct sentences involving one of the 
subcategories might or might not be abstract enough to apply to sentences 
of the other subcategories as well. For example, within the category "action 
relations" are included sentences with change-of-state verbs like "open" and 
"break." A child might initially produce change-of-state utterances with 
knowledge which did not apply to non-change-of-state action verbs like 
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"jump" and "read." Making constructions with the latter verbs would require 
a different kind of information which might not be acquired at exactly the 
same time. 
In short, the discovery of a sequence of emergence can provide some 
important hints as to what categories may be functional for the child, 
but does not in itself establish psychological reality. 
Evidence in Child Speech for Syntactic Relations 
In their sections on "Semantic Complexity" and "Pronominal-Nominal 
Variation," Bloom et al. continue the debate, opened in Bowerman's (1973) 
and Schlesinger's (1971) articles and furthered in Schlesinger's (1974) 
chapter, on the subject of whether children should be credited with a knowl- 
edge of syntactic relations at the two- and three-word utterance stage. Their 
discussion raises a number of important points which are worth close exam- 
ination. 
Before the substantive issues involved are taken up, however, a mis- 
understanding should be clarified. In my 1973 article I examined children's 
two- and three-word utterances for evidence which would justify crediting 
children at this stage of development with an understanding of syntactic re- 
lationships like subject and predicate. Finding none, I suggested that it is 
possible that children's earliest two- and three-word constructions are pro- 
duced with 
"simple rules to order words which are understood as perform- 
ing various semantic functions" such as agent, action, and possessor. Bloom 
et al. object to this proposal, evidently interpreting it as a claim that "chil- 
dren are learning only semantic structures" (p. 28; italics added). They 
argue that "Bowerman appears to confuse the claim that children are learning 
only the semantics of sentences when she fails to consider word-order rules 
as manifesting knowledge of syntax" (p. 28). 
A misinterpretation has led here to an apparent disagreement where 
there is in fact none. I have never argued that children in the initial stages of 
word combination have learned nothing about syntax. Insofar as constraints 
on word order are by definition treated by that part of linguistic description 
called syntax, knowledge of word order must be called syntactic knowl- 
edge. However, there is more to syntax than word order. An adequate repre- 
sentation of the syntactic structure of a sentence must specify not only the 
order in which the elements in the sentence appear but also the functional 
relationships which hold between them. The two aspects of syntax are by 
no means synonymous, as will be discussed subsequently. My arguments were 
concerned not with whether children possess any kind of knowledge at all 
which might be called syntactic but with whether the functional relation- 
ships between the elements in children's sentences can properly be called 
"syntactic" (with a specific meaning to be described shortly), or are better 
characterized in another way. 
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However, even when attention is restricted to the specific question of 
what would constitute evidence that children have learned syntactic rela- 
tionships, as opposed to relationships of some other kind, there are dif- 
ferences of opinion. This is the true issue at hand, and it is examined below. 
Relationships between the words (or phrases) in a sentence can be 
specified either on the basis of the way in which the referents of these words 
are related to each other or in terms of the way in which the words 
themselves function within the sentence regardless of their referents. Rela- 
tionships of the former kind are commonly called "semantic"; those of the 
latter kind are called 
"grammatical," or, as in Bowerman (1973), "syntac- 
tic" (to distinguish them from "semantic" relationships, which could also be 
considered a part of "grammar"). Semantic relationships thus have to do 
with meaning. Meaning can be characterized at various levels of abstraction. 
At the most concrete level, a semantic relationship can be identified on the 
basis of the specific lexical meaning of one of the words involved: for exam- 
ple, "recurrence" as the relationship holding between the word "more" and 
the name for that to which "moreness" is attributed. At various middle 
levels of abstraction, relationships can be specified on the basis of shared 
elements of meaning among groups of words. For example, "mommy eat," 
"daddy read," and "Johnny jump" can all be classed as agent-action strings 
because "eat," "read," and "jump" all identify activities which are initiated 
by animate beings (agents). Agent-action strings can be distinguished on 
the basis of their shared semantic features from, for example, experiencer- 
state sentences like 
"mommy see," "Johnny want," and "Daddy hear," in 
which the verbs name not actions but internal states which are passively ex- 
perienced. Finally, there are semantic relationships which are not defined 
on the basis of lexical meaning at all but by the fact that the referents of 
the words involved appear to be situationally related to each other in ways 
which are relatively easy to characterize: for example, when a child says 
"daddy shoe" while pointing to his father's shoe, "daddy" seems to iden- 
tify the possessor of the object mentioned; hence the utterance can be 
characterized as exhibiting a "possessor-possessed" relationship. 
In languages as they are spoken by adults, semantic relationships are less important as determinants of the way in which sentences are structured 
than syntactic relationships like "subject-predicate" and "verb-direct object." 
Syntactic relations are very abstract in that they subsume a number of 
semantic distinctions which could be made. For example, in adult speech, 
a relationship between subject and predicate is manifested in both the sen- 
tences 
"Johnny eats an apple" and "Johnny wants milk," despite the dif- ference in the meanings of the two verbs. By virtue of the existence of syn- tactic relations which are relatively indifferent to distinctions of lexical or 
situational meaning, languages are able to express an infinite number of 
semantic distinctions with a limited number of basic structural patterns and 
operations. 
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What kind of evidence in a corpus of utterances would justify crediting 
the speaker with knowledge of syntactic relations? Is this evidence present 
in early child speech? In the present Monograph, Bloom et al. take the fol- 
lowing position: "The fact that the same words (e.g., animate nouns) could 
function differently in relation to different kinds of verbs (e.g., as agents and 
movers) was taken as evidence that the children had made higher-order 
linguistic inductions about superordinate grammatical categories [e.g., sen- 
tence-subject]" (p. 3). More specifically, they point to the fact that some 
children can use the same sorts of words in the same position in different 
sentences to express different semantic functions. For example, in Kathryn's 
and Gia's speech, words like "Baby" and "Mommy" occurred in initial po- 
sition and functioned variously as agents, actors, movers, and possessors. In 
final position, words like "book" and "cookie" functioned as objects of actions 
or of locative actions and as possessions, and words like "bag" and "floor" 
functioned as place names. This is "interpreted as evidence that [the chil- 
dren] had learned the superordinate grammatical categories sentence-subject 
(including agents, actors, movers, and possessors), predicate-object (in- 
cluding objects of actions, locative actions, and possession), and predicate- 
complement (place), so that a number of semantic distinctions could be en- 
coded within the same grammatical system" (p. 19). 
Is the ability to use similar words in the same position in different 
sentences to express different semantic relationships sufficient evidence that 
a speaker has "made higher-order linguistic inductions about superordinate 
grammatical categories"-that he has learned syntactic concepts like sen- 
tence-subject? Not necessarily. Bever, Fodor, and Weksel (1965) point 
out in connection with adult language that "identity of order relations is 
compatible with considerable differences in syntactic form." This fact about 
syntactic structure is well illustrated by sentence pairs in which the same or 
similar words occupy identical positions and yet do not function syntacti- 
cally in the same way. For example, in the famous pair "John is eager to 
please" versus "John is easy to please," the first John functions as the deep 
structure subject of "please" while the second John functions as its direct 
object. In "Making mistakes can be annoying," "mistakes" functions as the 
direct object of "making," but in "Recurring mistakes can be annoying," 
"mistakes" functions not as the direct object of "recurring" but rather as 
a noun modified by it. In "John saw the house," "the house" functions syn- 
tactically as both deep and surface structure direct object of "saw," but 
in "John went home," "home" is not the direct object of "went." 
In all these sentence pairs, the syntactic difference between the con- 
stituents in question-the fact that they are not instances of the same rela- 
tional concept-is.not apparent when the utterances are looked at in isola- 
tion. But the distinction is clearly revealed by differences in the way in 
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which the constituents behave when they are subjected to the same linguis- 
tic operations. Consider the following examples (an asterisk indicates un- 
grammatical sentences): 
la. John is eager to please someone. 
lb. *John is easy to please someone. 
2a. Whom is John eager to please? 
2b. *Whom is John easy to please? 
3a. Making mistakes is annoying. 
3b. *Recurring mistakes is annoying. 
4a. Mistakes which recur are annoying. 
4b. *Mistakes which make are annoying. 
5a. The house was seen by John. 
5b. *Home was gone by John. 
6a. Where did John go? 
6b. *Where did John see? 
These examples demonstrate an important fact about syntactic function. 
Sentence constituents can be considered to perform the same syntactic func- 
tion in their respective sentences only if they are functionally equivalent- 
that is, if they act as if they are at some level of abstraction instances of the 
same concept. Constituents with the same syntactic function do occupy the 
same position in a given sentence frame, but, as the examples above show, 
not all constituents in that position necessarily share that function. Constitu- 
ents which are not actually equivalent sometimes appear superficially to 
be so when they occur in sentence frames which neutralize the distinction 
between them. However, their lack of equivalence is revealed when the 
neutralizing sentences are taken apart and reconstructed along slightly dif- 
ferent lines. Then we see that the constituents behave differently with re- 
spect, for example, to their effects on other parts of the sentence (e.g., in the 
determination of verb agreement, as example 3 above illustrates) or in terms 
of how they are treated in related sentences (see examples 1, 2, 4-6). 
In sum, occupation of the same sentence position is not a reliable clue 
to identity of syntactic function in adult speech. Yet Bloom et al. argue on 
the basis of word order evidence that children have made 
"linguistic induc- 
tions about superordinate grammatical categories such as sentence-subject." It is not clear why word order should be a more reliable guide to syntactic function in child speech than in adult speech. It simply is not strong enough to answer the critical question of whether children perceive certain words 
which in their respective sentences perform different semantic functions 
(such as agent or possessor) as functionally equivalent at some higher level 
of abstraction. It is theoretically quite possible that sentences like "mom- 
my open" (agent-action) and "mommy coat" (possessor-possessed) are pro- duced by reference to different sorts of linguistic knowledge (e.g., "agent 
precedes action" and "possessor precedes possessed") such that the two 
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"mommys" need not be regarded by the child as functionally similar in any 
sense.1 
In short, identity of word order is not a sufficient basis for establishing 
equivalence of syntactic function. Children who have learned to place words 
naming agents and possessors in initial position might or might not see 
any abstract similarity of function among these words. More information 
is needed before a conclusion can be drawn. However, Bloom et al. object 
to my (1973) insistence on stronger evidence for functional equivalence, 
such as the presence of transformations which operate the same way on con- 
stituents with different semantic roles. They argue that the "existence of 
a structure in child language needs to be justified by a test of the child-lan- 
guage data and not by tests that apply to adult-speech data" (p. 29). The 
problem with this objection is that the syntactic structures whose existences 
they wish to justify (e.g., subject-predicate-object) were originally iden- 
tified by linguists on the basis of rather specific characteristics of language 
as it is spoken by adults. How can such structures be proven to exist in 
child language unless one is willing to be held to at least some of the tests 
which demonstrate their existence in adult speech? If the putative structures 
in child speech are to be labeled by the adult terms, it seems essential that 
they be able to meet some (not necessarily all) of the same tests rather than 
entirely different ones; otherwise, it is not at all clear that the same phe- 
nomena are being described. Rather than characterize the structural phe- 
nomena which Bloom et al. have identified with terms which have specific 
meanings in the linguistic description of adult language, I would prefer to 
take the advice Bloom et al. offer elsewhere in their paper, that it is "more 
1 The authors themselves appear to resist following their own test for the 
existence of superordinate grammatical categories to its logical conclusion, appar- 
ently recognizing that implausibly dissimilar sentence constituents thereby would 
have to be interpreted as performing the same grammatical function. In accordance 
with their test, they consider animate nouns appearing in first position in two-word 
sentences to be sentence-subjects regardless of whether they function semantically 
as agents, actors, movers, or possessors. However, inanimate nouns in second posi- 
tion are not all interpreted as having the same syntactic function. Rather, their 
semantic function is used to assign them to one of two different superordinate gram- 
matical categories: predicate-object (object of action or locative action, possession) 
or predicate-complement (place). Thus, "box" in a sentence like "put box" would 
be considered to function syntactically as a predicate-object if the box were the 
object being moved, while it would be considered a predicate-complement if it 
named the location to which something else was being moved. If identity of words 
and of sentence position does not necessitate that the two "boxes" be assigned to 
the same superordinate grammatical category, why should the three "mommys" in 
mommy open" (agent-action), "mommy go" (mover-locative action), and "mom- 
my coat" (possessor-possessed) necessarily be considered to share the same syn- 
tactic function, that of sentence-subject? 
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profitable to describe such facts of child language on their own terms . . . 
rather than in terms of goodness of fit with one or another preconceived 
system of analysis or linguistic theory" (p. 25). 
Conclusions 
Since space is limited, I have elected to focus primarily on methodologi- 
cal and interpretive problems rather than to comment on the many positive 
features of this Monograph. The reason the problems are worth talking about 
is that this is an important work at this point in the study of child-language 
development. The authors have raised some critical questions about the pro- 
cesses involved in language acquisition, and their answers to these questions 
may have considerable influence on the direction taken by future studies 
in the field. 
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COMMENTARY BY MICHAEL P. MARATSOS 
The present Monograph by Bloom et al. presents important naturalistic 
evidence relevant to two kinds of early structural development: the problem 
of alternative initial structures children use in beginning the formulation of 
the grammatical structure of their language, and the sequence of semantic 
relations children use language to express. The discussion strikes me as most 
important and best supported in the consideration of the different ways 
young children may initially acquire grammatical structure. There is already 
some history of reported differences among children in grammatical acqui- 
sition styles. Summarizing evidence from different investigators, Brown 
(1973) noted that children seem to vary in how strictly and in what manner 
they use word order to express semantic relations, particularly in languages 
where word order is more flexible than English. Brown, Cazden, and Bellugi- 
Klima (1969) discussed how one of their three subjects, Sarah, tended to put 
in more verb and noun inflections at a given level of average sentence length 
than the other two subjects studied, who employed more content words 
such as nouns and verbs at the same MLU. Most relevant, Bloom (1970) 
and Brown (1973) each noted that in the beginning of grammatical acqui- 
sition in English, some children have more of a "pivot look" than do others. 
Such children more often used single words in a constant position to mark 
a particular relation. To mark recurrence, for example, the child might use 
the formula more + word, as in more ball, more shoe. Brown hypothesized 
that the expression of some relations might lend itself more to such a look 
than others. Other relations seem more naturally to take a wider range of 
freely varying words in appropriate orders: for example, the relation action- 
affected object is expressed in get ball, push table, kick chair, where no 
single word marks the relation. The form of the child's speech could thus be 
largely determined by the semantic functions the child chooses to express 
in his speech. 
In the present work, however, the authors have raised considerations 
suggesting that semantic function and grammatical form may be partly au- 
tonomous even in early speech, and children may structure their early acqui- 
sition on the basis of a preference for one grammatical form over another. 
Two of their children seem consistently to have produced pivot-like sen- 
tences, corresponding as the authors note to a synthetic grammatical style. 
For a brief time these two children appear consistently to have marked the 
affected-object relation with an inflection-like attachment to the verb, for 
example, get it, push it, kick it, get this one, where it and this one appear 
as constant markers for the affected-object relation. Similarly, pronominal forms such as there and right there often marked location. The other two 
children consistently used the style corresponding to get ball, kick table, or 
for location, put in box, with no particular single-word markers for the re- 
lation, corresponding to an analytic grammatical style. 
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As the authors note, for these children form does not appear completely 
to follow function but to be a partly autonomous consideration. Such a find- 
ing shows in a particularly sharp way the availability of different kinds of 
structural analyses to children as they acquire language. Recent work in 
early grammatical acquisition has tended to emphasize the cognitive and 
semantic base of language structure. This development has been a healthy 
one that has rendered more comprehensible the facts of early acquisition. 
But on the other hand, there has perhaps been an accompanying tendency 
to dilute or forget the importance of the acquisition of structural devices 
per se. The present Monograph strikes me as containing a potentially dra- 
matic corrective influence in its finding that the reality of different structural 
devices may be very strong for the child beginning acquisition. 
In the preceding discussion I have largely assumed that the evidence 
strongly supports the authors' conclusions. By and large I believe it does 
(see table 3), but not as strongly as do the authors. The authors claim, for 
example, that there was an "impressive consistency" for preference of one 
linguistic system over the other before MLU of 2.0. The period that sup- 
ports this claim seems to me to end considerably earlier. For example, Eric 
at MLU of 1.69 uses pronominal expression (e.g., get it) of affected-object 
32 times, but full noun expression (e.g., get ball) 33 times. Similarly, 
Kathryn at MLU 1.89 has a preference for noun over pronominal expressions 
of affected-object, but the occurrences are 81 and 41, respectively, which 
seems like a preference, not the exclusive use of one system (compare to 
MLU = 1.32, where the ratio is 44 to 4). Nor is the evidence as strong 
in general as one might desire for the two pivot-look subjects. The periods 
where pronominal dominance is really marked are ones where expression of 
the relevant relations is often barely or marginally productive. The authors 
note at the end of the paper that the present evidence provides only a 
beginning, and I laud their caution. 
The other major topic treated by the authors is the sequence of se- 
mantic relations coded in the children's speech. Some of the work here 
seems less convincing than in the grammatical variation section. The evi- 
dence seems good that the verbal expression of actions (e.g., pushing, put- 
ting) preceded that of states (e.g., wanting, possessing). But the authors 
seem to waver between judging productivity by absolute numbers of a se- 
mantic relation produced in a sample and judging by the changes in pro- 
portion. For the data here, setting an absolute number threshold seems 
more satisfactory. Some conclusions change, I think, when this is done. One 
claim in the paper is that referential relations of recurrence, negation, and 
existence develop before verb relations (e.g., action, state, locative action, 
locative state). The evidence for this conclusion is that, although the abso- 
lute number of expressions of both major semantic types rises with develop- 
ment, the proportion of total utterances which express referential relations 
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decreases. Such general proportion measures may be too gross, though. 
Using the absolute number criterion for productivity (roughly, five instances 
of a type corresponds to productivity), we find that action relations are pro- 
ductive as early as any of the three referential relations for three of the four 
children. For three of the children, at least one of the three referential re- 
lations reaches productivity only after at least one of the verb relations. 
Negation, clearly a crucial relation, reaches productive status for two of the 
children only after two verb relations have become productive. Recurrence 
comes very late for a third child. Only existence (pointing out or naming 
objects) is consistently at least tied with the earliest verb relations in pro- 
ductivity. Other problems arise with the claim that the expression of lo- 
cation follows nonlocative expressions. As the authors note, this sequence 
holds for two of the children, while locative and nonlocative relations appear 
together for the two girls. At this time, a score of two wins and two ties 
seems like motivation to proceed with extreme caution. In general, I find 
less constancy in the developmental sequences of semantic relations than do 
the authors. 
Aside from such problems, however, the work of this section offers con- 
siderable interest, particularly in the remarks about accounting for sequen- 
tiality in acquisition. Especially useful is the distinction between cognitive 
and semantic acquisition. As the authors note, a child might well have a 
concept for a long time before it finds linguistic expression for any of a 
number of reasons, including his motivation to communicate linguistically, the availability and difficulty of the relevant linguistic forms, or the salience 
of the form and meaning in contexts. A natural hypothesis, for example, is 
that, even for a child who cognizes both actions and internal states, states 
would achieve later expression: simple actions are more overtly conspicuous in a context than are internal states such as wanting or needing, and the 
child should find it easier to divine that linguistic expressions refer to them. 
In short, the present Monograph offers a rich mass of evidence and 
conceptualizations dealing with semantic and grammatical structural prob- lems in early language acquisition, often with interesting and important im- 
plications. The section on early grammatical variation in particular offers the beginning of important evidence about the structural resources and incli- 
nations the child brings to the acquisition of linguistic structures, and the 
work on semantic relations provides a beginning wide range of suggestions 
and possibilities for use in future work. 
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REPLY BY THE AUTHORS 
The theoretical issues raised by Melissa Bowerman and Michael Ma- 
ratsos have been discussed at length elsewhere (Bloom, Miller, & Hood, in 
press), and we will reply here to only the methodological question that was 
raised in their comments: when is the evidence adequate for supporting one 
or another set of conclusions about child language? The issue is a substan- 
tive one that is important to us (see Bloom 1970; Bloom 1974). In par- 
ticular, Bowerman questioned the basic methodological decision of setting 
an arbitrary frequency criterion for productivity in the language behavior 
of the children we observed. In order to test the developmental sequence of 
semantic-syntactic relations that resulted from the descriptive analysis, and 
to respond to the criticism of Bowerman and Maratsos, we have performed 
a statistical analysis of the data that supports the conclusions that had been 
reached. 
The requirement that was imposed on the data, and the issue in ques- 
tion, was the occurrence of five different utterances within a category for 
assuming that the utterances within the category derived from knowledge of 
a linguistic rule or rules. Setting the number of required utterances at pre- 
cisely five was an arbitrary decision. The frequency of a category within a 
given time span is relevant to determining productivity in any paradigm for 
the study of child language that assumes a developmental model. That is, 
at an early point in time the child does not know or does not use some rule, 
and at some later time he does. Although one can never be sure of the exact 
moment of onset, given the time span of each observation and the number 
of speech events observed, five different utterances was presumed to repre- 
sent evidence of linguistic knowledge. We have less confidence that four or 
fewer utterances clearly shows the absence of such knowledge. The prob- 
lem is one that exists in any developmental study that depends upon sam- 
pling behavior, where a complete record is not possible. While quite aware 
of the problem, we are not aware of any wholly satisfactory answer. 
94 
COMMENTARY AND REPLY 
Bowerman observed that such an absolute frequency criterion is more 
likely to be met as more utterances occur, so that a category that was con- 
sidered nonproductive at an earlier time may have been productive at that 
time if the sample had been larger, and thus Bowerman suggests that sample 
size should be constant. However, the number of multiword utterances was 
small in the earliest observations because the children had barely begun to 
use multiword utterances. Restricting the size of the later samples to con- 
form with the size of the earlier samples could have eliminated just those 
utterances in the later data that represented developmental change. 
What Bowerman suggests, essentially, is that it is not the absolute num- 
ber of occurrences but the proportional number of occurrences at successive 
observations that indicates development. In fact, it was proportional inter- 
actions in the data which were the major source of evidence in this investi- 
gation, as indicated throughout the text and in the tables and figures. Using 
the same number of utterances for each observation as Bowerman (quoting 
Brown, Cazden, & Bellugi-Klima 1969) recommended is only a way of assur- 
ing a proportional comparison. If proportional measures are used, then it is 
not necessary to obtain a constant number of utterances in each sample. The 
developmental sequence of verb relations reported in our study (the first six 
categories in table 2) was based upon the criterion of five or more different 
utterances in a category, but the proportion of utterances in the categories 
in each observation can also be compared, and we have done so here. 
The developmental sequence of verb relations was tested in the fol- 
lowing ways. First, the proportional distribution of the categories was deter- 
mined (N = the total number of verb relations in all samples) for each 
child. For example, for Eric, Times I through V, there were 707 verb rela- 
tions, counting only different utterances, and the proportional distribution 
was action (.45), locative action (.19), locative state (.07), state (.16), 
notice (.11), intention (.02). For each of the categories, the overall pro- 
portion was used as the expected proportion and compared with the pro- 
portion of utterances in that category in each sample. In that sample in 
which the criterion of productivity (N 2 5) first occurred, the proportion 
(p) was either equal to or greater than the expected p in 19 out of 24 trials 
(six categories, four subjects). In the last samples, for the action category (the earliest category to appear), p was always less than expected, but in 
12 of 16 trials when the category was either state, notice, or intention (the 
later developing categories), p was equal to or greater than expected. The 
most revealing result of this analysis was that in 46 of 59 samples before 
the criterion for productivity occurred, p was less than expected. The hy- 
pothesis that the observed proportional frequency would be the same as the 
expected (overall) frequency before the criterion for productivity was 
reached was tested by sign test, and rejected; the probability of a lower p in 46 of 59 trials, using a one-tailed test, was less than .001. As an example 
of these interactions, the proportional frequencies in the category locative 
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action from Eric were: expected (overall) p, .19; Time I, N = 0; Time II, 
p = .08; Time III, p = .17, N = 7 (productivity); Time IV, p = .22; 
Time V, p = .19. 
The proportional interactions were tested by X2 as follows for those 
categories that were presumed to develop later than the action categories 
according to the productivity criterion. The data from the four children 
were combined to compare the number of utterances in a particular cate- 
gory in all the samples before the productivity criterion was reached, with 
the number of utterances in the four samples (one from each child) in which 
the criterion was reached, and the number of utterances not included in the 
test category. For example, in the category locative state, there were nine 
locative-state utterances and 279 non-locative-state utterances in 11 obser- 
vations before productivity criterion, and 84 locative-state and 700 non- 
locative-state utterances in the four criterion samples. The null hypothesis 
of no difference in the proportional occurrence of utterances before and 
after criterion was rejected for locative state, X2 = 15.0, p < .001; state, 
x2 = 16.26, p < .001; and intention, X2 - 86, p < .001. The differences 
were not significantly different for the notice category (the category singled 
out by Bowerman for discussion). 
One can conclude from these analyses that the proportional occurrence 
of utterances within a category is not constant developmentally; the ob- 
served proportional values for each category reached the expected values or 
exceeded the expected values when the absolute frequency criterion for 
productivity (N > 5) was reached. The X2 analysis provided statistical sup- 
port for the arbitrary frequency criterion that was used as an index of pro- 
ductivity for evaluating sequential development in the original analysis. 
One other point: the alternative explanation that is suggested by Bower- 
man for the developmental sequence we reported has to do with the corre- 
sponding relative frequencies of categories of utterances in parent speech. 
However, cause-effect relations in correlation data are difficult to establish. 
In this regard, it is noteworthy that the many recent studies of parent input 
to children have reported an important influence in the opposite direction- 
that what parents say to children is dependent upon what their children have 
already learned about language (e.g., Phillips 1973). 
Both Maratsos and Bowerman have questioned the developmental se- 
quence, and our result as well as their challenge to it can be tested with 
other data. We do not expect that the entire sequence will be "universal." 
Potential variation among the verb categories may reflect a number of fac- 
tors; for example, "want" often predominates in the early sentences of other 
(usually not firstborn) children from whom anecdotal evidence is available. 
At the same time, a more interesting finding in our data was the fact that 
early locative sentences involved movement, and stative locative sentences 
appeared subsequently. We expect that this result (among others), which is 
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based on aspects of cognitive development, will be replicated in studies of 
other children, whereas verbs of notice and state may be subject to greater 
variation, possibly due to influence from different environmental inputs. 
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